

THE GLOBAL UNITION 2014

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL STUDY GUIDE



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“The number of people killed by the sanctions in Iraq is greater than the total number of people killed by all weapons of mass destruction in all of history.”

THE CHAIRPERSON'S ADDRESS

Delegates,

I warmly welcome you to the Historic Security Council at The Global Unition 2014.

It gives me great pleasure to chair an esteemed committee like the UNHSC where we expect the delegates to face crises of international standards and solve them in ways top world leaders have failed.

The United Nations Security Council, at TGU'14 will deal with a seemingly general but extremely alarming crisis that has faced the world in the recent past. The agenda for the three day conference, is the extremely controversial Iraq War-a conflict that brought the world to the verge of a nuclear war.

The committee will be placed in the year 2004 and any incidents, revelations or reports after the said year shall not be taken into account. We will be discussing the agenda in detail and hope to bring up unnoticed and often, unknown facts about the conflict that was initially a US-Iraq squabble but soon led to world friction, killing thousands of thousands of people across the continent.

The war has had several phases. The initial reason cited by the Bush administration for the US invasion of Iraq was the suspected possession of elements of mass destruction by the Saddam Hussein government in Iraq. No such potential weapons were later found by the investigating committee led by David Kay. US reasons for invasion, were, needless to say, far more deep rooted and far less transparent.

We are in a world where in spite of the fact that David Kay has stepped down from the Iraq Survey Group after openly declaring "*I don't think they existed ... I don't think there was a large-scale production program in the '90s.*", the US has not retreated from Iraq.

There are thousands of questions that remain for you to answer. Delegates, there's a lot to be done.

That said and done, I would also like to take this opportunity to introduce the Executive Board to you.

I am a student of class XI in the Science stream and take great interest in debate and public speaking. The fun element in the otherwise no-nonsense executive board, I take a keen interest in art films and classics, TV shows, and music. Your co-chairperson, Shynelle Singh, a student of class XI in the humanities stream, is an avid MUNer and powerful orator. Think twice before contradicting her. On anything. Your director, Shayeri Bhattacharya is a student of class X Pursuing science and is really the most enthusiastic one around.

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With this extraordinarily well qualified executive board, I assure you the best experience at UNSC, TGU'14.

We look forward to see you this September.

Yours truly,

Sreenidhi Sharma,

Chairperson,

United Nations Security Council,

The Global Unition 2014.

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THE TOPIC AREA SUMMARY

The topic for the United Nations Security Council is "Iraq War: A UN failure?" This committee shall be in session in the year 2004, after David Kay steps down from the Iraq Survey Group and openly declares, "*I don't think they existed ... I don't think there was a large-scale production program in the '90s.*", referring to the suspected Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction which was cited as the main reason for US invasion of Iraq by the then president George Bush.

The US-Iraq squabble but soon led to world friction, killing thousands of thousands of people across the continent. Saddam Hussein led a brutal dictatorship of Iraq from 1979 to 2003. In 1990, he invaded and occupied the nation of Kuwait for six months until being expelled by an international coalition. For the next several years Hussein showed varying degrees of contempt for the international terms agreed to at the end of the war, namely a "no-fly zone" over much of the country, international inspections of suspected arms sites, and sanctions. In 2003, an American-led coalition invaded Iraq and overthrew the Hussein government. Building the Coalition: President Bush put forward a number of rationales for invading Iraq. These included: violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions, atrocities committed by Hussein against his people, and the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which posed an immediate threat to the U.S. and the world. The U.S. claimed to have intelligence which proved the existence of the WMD and asked the U.N. Security Council to authorize an attack. The council did not. Instead, the U.S. and the United Kingdom enlisted 29 other countries in a "coalition of the willing" to support and carry out the invasion launched in March 2003.

The War had a miserable impact not only on the men fighting the war on either sides, but also on innocent civilians in Iraq. Around 15000 Iraqi insurgents were killed and thousands of thousands of Iraqi insurgents and civilians killed and wounded. 848 US soldiers were killed. Total insurgent attacks count upto 26,496.

The US reasons of invasion, were, obviously not as transparent as they wanted it to seem to be. A study of the historical background of the country, which dates back to World War 1 throws some light on the brutal war that brought the world to the verge of a third world war. These include:

The oil history in Iraq: Britain took the lion's share of Iraq's oil by gaining military control of the country during World War I. The powerful Iraq Petroleum Company, in which US and French interests held minority positions, kept a monopoly of Iraq's oil sector until nationalization in 1972.

British Colonialism and Repression in Iraq: Britain set up a colonial regime in Iraq after a long military campaign during World War I. In response to Iraqi resistance, British forces battled for over a decade to pacify the country, using airplanes, armored cars, firebombs and mustard gas. Winston Churchill, as responsible cabinet minister in the early years, saw Iraq as an experiment in high-technology colonial control.

US-British support for Hussein: US intelligence helped Saddam's Ba`ath Party seize power for the first time in 1963. In the 1980s, the US and Britain gave Saddam arms, money, satellite intelligence, military advisors and even

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chemical & bio-weapon precursors.

The Gulf War: US high-pressure tactics in the Security Council lined up support for the war that ousted Iraq from Kuwait. A punishing air campaign, followed by years of sanctions, took a heavy toll on civilians. Though Council resolutions focused on weapons, and said nothing about regime-change, the US and UK announced in 1991 that their policy aimed at nothing less than overthrowing Saddam Hussein.

Are the US invasions of invasion darker than what it seems? Or did Saddam Hussein really aim for world conquest? Do thousands of innocent lives lost mean nothing to the world fraternity?

There are millions of questions to be resolved.

The world in is turmoil. Unite. For a better World.

Because. Together We Rise.

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THE COMMITTEE:

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

HISTORY, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

The UN Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of set.

“The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”

According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:

- ① to maintain international peace and security;
- ② to develop friendly relations among nations;
- ③ to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- ④ and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City.

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It also travelled to many cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama City, Panama, and in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1990. A representative of each of its members must be present at all times at UN Headquarters so that the Security Council can meet at any time as the need arises.

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

CHAPTER 5: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

COMPOSITION :Article 23:

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equiSection geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS: Article 24:

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

VOTING: Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

PROCEDURE: Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.
2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29:

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30:

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31:

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32:

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations

HISTORIC COMMITTEE DYNAMICS

The Historical Crisis Committee is a continuous crisis committee, making it quite different from the normal MUN committee. Delegates' decisions and actions will immediately affect the perpetual crisis at hand, and the plots and predicaments that delegates will be asked to deal with are only partially revealed prior to the conference, making for an unpredictable, volatile, and urgent, but undoubtedly exciting, experience. Delegates interested in the HCC will thus need to be prepared to partake in intensive and urgent debate while still possessing a fine-tuned handle on diplomatic conduct. Detailed research and preparation prior to the conference will be important, but wits and the ability to think on one's feet will also be essential.

It is extremely important to note that a historic committee is only set in a particular historical year and focuses on a specific agenda for discussion. We will be in session in the said year, and any reports/statistics/events after the said year will not be taken into consideration.

It is really easy to excel in a historic crisis committee given that it tests more of your instantaneous responses and immediate thinking than your ability to learn up chapters of the Charter. So, if you know your matter and chronology well enough, you're a winner!

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS OF THE WAR

2003:

." On March 20th at 7:57 A.M., the first confirmed skirmish between American and Iraqi forces takes place. By 4:00 p.m. that day, there are at least 7 raids on Baghdad. On March 19 at 9:34 p.m. — two days after demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay surrender and leave Iraq within 48 hour — the U.S.-led coalition begins bombing Baghdad. Strikes are first made against "targets of opportunity" on the outskirts of Baghdad. In his address to the nation at 10:16 p.m. e.s.t., President Bush outlines the purpose of invading Iraq: "to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger. On March 20, about 300,000 American and British troops invade Iraq. Most members of the U.N. oppose the war. On May 1, President Bush declares victory, but violence erupts against American soldiers and Iraqis who support them. ... Due to lax security, looters manage to steal priceless archaeological relics from the National Museum in Baghdad, and tons of explosives are stolen from an Iraqi weapons facility. ... The Iraqi Army is disbanded, and members of Saddam's ruling Baath party are prohibited from participating in the government. ... In December, Saddam is found in a small underground hideout.

“We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression... given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11 world.”

-George Bush, addressing the nation soon after the bombing of Baghdad begins.

2004

After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, David Kay, who searched for WMD during the first Gulf War, leads the U.S. weapons inspection team known as the Iraq Survey Group. In less than one year, Kay tells a Senate committee that no WMD have been found in Iraq. "It turns out that we were all wrong," he testifies on January 28, though he maintains that he still believes the war was the right thing to do in light of the continuing threat posed by Saddam. In fact, soon after he steps down, Kay says in an interview that Iraq never gave up its ambition to obtain WMD and in fact "had a large number of WMD program-related activities." Charles Duelfer takes over Kay's role, releasing the Survey Group's final report, which affirms that no WMD were found, in September of 2004; the search is officially ended on January 12, 2005.

"I don't think they existed ... I don't think there was a large-scale production program in the '90s."

—**David Kay**, stepping down January 23 as leader of the Iraq Survey Group.

A temporary constitution is approved. ... Photographs reveal abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers in the Abu Ghraib prison. Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, a fierce opponent of American involvement in Iraq, leads an uprising against U.S. troops. Terror attacks occur almost daily.

ANY EVENT AFTER THE YEAR 2004 SHALL NOT BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERTAION

CAUSES OF THE WAR

The years since the invasion of Iraq have undermined the administration's stated rationales for war. A majority of Americans believes the administration intentionally misled the public about Iraq. Among foreign policy scholars the question arises repeatedly: Why did the U.S. invade Iraq? Did the administration go to war based on an overly aggressive reading of the evidence? If so, why? Or did the administration go to war for unstated reasons that go beyond Iraq such as oil, Israel, and geopolitics? Why *did* the United States invade Iraq? Did the administration go to war based on an overly aggressive reading of intelligence? If this was the case, what explains such a reading of the evidence? Was this a case of groupthink, incompetence, or selective perception induced by ideological commitments? Did administration leaders go to war primarily for unstated or private motives such as oil, the security of Israel or to "settle an old score"? Was the invasion not really about Iraq but instead about a broader set of foreign policy goals?

On March 22, 2003 President George W. Bush told America that, "Our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam's support of terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people" (Bush March 22, 2003). The years since have fully revealed that the WMD threat was not the urgent threat the administration declared and that Saddam Hussein was not involved with Al Qaeda or 9/11. At least in part because of these revelations a majority of Americans now believe that invading Iraq was a mistake and that the administration purposely misled the public to build support for war.

Not WMD, Not Iraq, Not 9/11, Not Terrorism

The most obvious agreement among experts was that the Bush administration's arguments for war were not in fact the most important motivations at work. The majority of experts surveyed did not believe WMD were a central driving force, did not believe that Iraq itself was the focus of the war, and saw little connection between the war and the events of 9/11 or the war on terrorism. As one respondent put it, "[T]he gap between the Administration's publicly stated reasons for the war and the real reasons behind this decision is the widest ever as well in the history of American wars." The survey findings reveal these agreements in several ways.

Section One. Factors Behind the Decision to Invade

Second, as Section Two shows, most respondents did not believe that the administration truly believed that Iraq represented an urgent WMD threat. The openended responses show that a simple count understates the level of doubt. Even those respondents who granted that the administration *might* have believed there was a threat tended not to believe that it was Iraqi WMD that was the *motivation* to invade.

Section Two. Private Administration Beliefs about Iraqi WMD

Finally, respondents also doubted the other pillar of justification for war – Iraq as the central front in the war on terror. In fact, for our respondents the war on terrorism appears to have played an even smaller role than WMD. As Section One indicates, terrorism was just the 8th most mentioned factor. Further, as Section Three shows, very few believed that 9/11 played a significant independent role motivating administration officials toward invading Iraq. The assumption here is that 9/11 should have played an important "triggering" role if one of the administration's main concerns was the global fight against terrorism and the administration truly believed that Iraq was a key element of that fight. Instead, most believed that 9/11's importance lay primarily in providing a window of opportunity for pro-war forces to make their case and for the administration to take aggressive action without fear of public censure.

Section Three. The Role of 9/11

To those who study these issues closely the fact that experts don't believe the Bush administration may seem rather unsurprising at this point. What many experts do not realize, however, is the stark contrast between expert views and those of the general public. Though experts have begun to construct alternative explanations for Iraq,

the public remains far more divided and far more wedded to the Bush administration's justifications for war. In fact, as Section Four indicates, despite near consensus among experts about the irrelevance of these factors, roughly half of the public at the same point still believed Saddam Hussein was connected to 9/11, that Iraq had WMD before the war, and that Iraq was part of the war on terrorism. Moreover, it is important to note that mass opinion on these issues had not changed much since 2003 despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary.

Section Four. Public Beliefs about the War in Iraq

The Glue That Binds:

Neoconservative Ideology and the Assertion of US Dominance

The most consistent statement to emerge from data about what *did* happen was the importance respondents attached to neoconservative (neo-con) ideology and the grand strategic vision it promoted. Indeed, this was the thread running through a great number of the responses to all of the existing open-ended questions. Leading figures within the Bush Administration, linked with the Project for a New American Century and sincerely believing that American unilateral hegemony in the international system was (a) pragmatically necessary for the health of the international system, (b) in America's national interest, and (c) morally justified because of the relative 'goodness' of the American way of life, decided that the United States needed to act as a far more energetic and effective world hegemon than had been the case under either the George H.W. Bush or the Bill Clinton Administration. Iraq was, in my opinion, chosen as a supposedly easy target for what has been called the "demonstration effect" of American leadership, military strength and moral superiority (through free enterprise and democratization). The alleged presence of WMD was merely a pretense for the assertion of a new supposedly benign American imperial role. The fact that this whole policy was misconceived, mishandled and counterproductive, should not hide the fact that it was part of a clear and systematic world view held by those leaders and that they consciously decided to use Iraq as the first step of a wider design intended to eventually enable the United States to act unilaterally anywhere around the world with relative impunity.

- 1.) To establish a robust strategic military presence in the oil rich Middle east.
- 2.) To be able to surround Iran on both sides with US military forces, and also threaten Syria.
- 3.) To secure Iraq's oil reserves for the US and UK .
- 4.) To provide a demonstration case and establish a precedent for the Bush doctrine of preventive war. ...

Section Five. Who Influenced the Decision to Invade?

The importance is worth extended consideration because of its connection to the second most popular factor behind the decision to invade Iraq: oil. The focus on oil seems intertwined with a belief that Cheney was the key player in moving the country to war. That oil placed second on the list of most often mentioned factors in the open-ended questions was surprising in the sense that the Bush administration never discussed oil as part of its justification for war. And though the consensus on Cheney is in some ways not surprising – many observers have argued Cheney is the most influential Vice President in the history of the country – it is nevertheless noteworthy because academics and policymakers rarely agree to this degree about anything. No other arguments made about the decision making process received such widespread endorsement in our survey as the pivotal role of Cheney. What motivated Cheney? As discussed above, 70% of respondents ranked the factor to "Assert U.S. Dominance in the 'New American Century'" as high for Cheney, making this the most agreed upon factor for Cheney, as it was for the other decision makers. Section Four, however, shows that "Control Iraq oil/ promote US corporate oil interests," ranked as the second most important factor for Cheney followed closely by

"Protecting oil supplies and oil price stability." We designed the survey to have two different "oil factors," having discovered in pre-survey interviews that people made a distinction between them. Numerous people stressed that there was a possible "national interest" in protecting oil supplies and maintaining oil price stability, while others stressed that an invasion would not serve a "national interest" in oil (as it would be wiser to do other things than invade Iraq to protect oil supplies and oil price stability), but an invasion, while costly to the nation, would serve "private interests" in actually gaining U.S. control of Iraq's oil and thereby promoting US corporate oil interests.

The most frequent and fully explicated oil arguments in the survey, and perhaps the most interesting in their variety, were the “protect oil supplies” type arguments. More than 14% of respondents made this type of argument in some form in the open-ended questions. Very common were arguments about problems with Saudi Arabia: Oil. 9/11 made Saudi Arabia look unreliable or unsection in the long run. That is, destabilizing Islamists looked too strong. Given how many in the administration, for a diverse set of reasons, long supported invasion, the post-9/11 analysis of oil brought Bush to their side to grab the oil fields in case the Wahabis took charge in Saudi Arabia, 9/11 ... increased pressure for US policymakers to create a strong ally that could provide US bases, act in concert with US interests, and control significant oil reserves in the Middle East. In other words, Iraq might serve as a more reliable replacement for the House of Saud. To secure a military position in the region and secure global oil markets, since continued military presence in Saudi Arabia was no longer feasible, and clearly dangerous. The most persuasive strategic argument is that the United States sought to create a friendly regime (ideally a democratic one) in oil-rich Iraq in order to lessen its dependence on Saudi Arabia, given the latter country’s complicity with terrorism. It is very interesting to note, and somewhat perplexing, that although the factor “Control Iraq oil/promote US corporate oil interests” garnered significantly more support (56%) for Cheney in the matrix over “Protecting oil supplies” (42%), only a very small number of respondents actually articulated possible corporate oil interests in their open-ended responses. One who did, for example, argued: “I think Halliburton and others always wanted their oil ...”

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

GULF WAR AND 9/11

The Bush administration made the argument that in the post-9/11 climate there should be a belated reckoning with Saddam Hussein. He had continued to sponsor terrorism, had over the years invaded or attacked four of his neighbors, and had killed tens of thousands of his own people. He was surely more a threat to the region and to his own people than either Bashar Assad or Moammar Qaddafi was eight years later. In this context, the end of the 1991 Gulf War loomed large. Its denouement had led not to the removal of a defeated Saddam, but to mass slaughter of Kurds and Shiites. Twelve years of no-fly zones had seen periods of conflict, and the enforcement of those zones no longer enjoyed much, if any, international support — suggesting that Saddam would soon be able to reclaim his regional stature. Many of the architects or key players in the 1991 war were once again in power in Washington, and many of them had in the ensuing decade become remorseful about the ending of the prior conflict. The sense of the need to correct a mistake became all the more potent after 9/11. The inclusion of too many allies, which hampered U.S. choices; the shakedown of allies to help defray the cost; the realist and inhumane ending to the conflict; the ongoing persecution of Shiites, Marsh Arabs, and Kurds; and the continuation of Saddam Hussein in power.

Since there was no direct connection between Osama bin Laden and Saddam, take away the security apprehensions following 9/11, and George Bush probably would not have taken the risk of invading Iraq. By the same token, had the 1991 Gulf War ended differently, or had the U.N. and the NATO allies continued to participate fully in the no-fly zones and the containment of Iraq, there likewise would not have been a 2003 invasion. The Iraq War was predicated, rightly or wrongly, on the notion that the prior war with Saddam had failed and containment would fail, and that after 9/11 it was the proper time to end a sponsor of global terrorism that should have been ended in 1991 — a decision that, incidentally, would save Kurdistan and allow it to turn into one of the most successful and pro-American regions in the Middle East.

Over 85% of the experts we consulted agreed that 9/11 was critical to the decision to invade Iraq in that “the events of 9/11 provided a window of opportunity for the administration to do something they already wanted to do.” “The events of 9/11 changed how leaders viewed the threat from Iraq.” These different characterizations helped reveal major disagreements among respondents, who were also asked to fully explain their thoughts on the precise role of 9/11 in an open-ended question. We found sharp disputes about whether or not 9/11 changed only the public mood, or if it also changed the thinking of Bush administration leaders. Further, and more interesting, were the many different and very specific ways in which respondents believed that 9/11 reshaped the thinking of administration

leaders. The most common argument about the importance of 9/11 was the description of how those events changed public opinion and softened the potential resistance to military action in Iraq:

[9/11] got American people to go along with presidential actions that might otherwise be questioned.

9/11 made the public subject to fear so they could be manipulated.

9/11 provided the ability to mobilize Democrats and popular support – intervention would have otherwise lacked popular support.

It rescued the Bush presidency from a period in which it was floundering, losing popularity and failing to organize itself adequately to conduct successful domestic and foreign policies.

Though it was widely agreed that 9/11 created a permissive public mood, quite a few

respondents stressed that 9/11 simply allowed the Bush administration to pursue plans it already had in mind:

It served as a galvanizing event to scare the American people and give license to the government to pursue nefarious plans drawn up years earlier. Without 9/11 Bush would have done a major air power campaign against Iraq at some point. 9/11 allowed him to go in on the ground.

Other respondents disagreed and argued 9/11 did not simply create a political opportunity; instead they stressed how 9/11 significantly changed the strategic thinking

of the top leaders: 9/11 made the Administration extraordinarily risk averse about

anything that might be seen as having contributed to another major terrorist attack on US soil. 9/11 reframed the risk presented by Iraq. What had seemed acceptable before 9/11 appeared unacceptable afterwards. For Bush, 9/11 changed his view. For the neocons, it provided the window of opportunity.

After 9/11 Bush felt “called” to the war on terrorism ... Other respondents did not think 9/11 directly led to the invasion of Iraq, but instead linked 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq through Afghanistan: 9/11 led to the invasion of Afghanistan, which in turn motivated the invasion of Iraq by inducing excessive optimism about what can be achieved through the use of force. 9/11 did change how they viewed the world, and they wanted to invade Iraq anyway but couldn’t have done it without 9/11. Afghanistan may also have been important: they thought that war was easy and figured the next one would be too.

Reasoning from a different angle, many experts emphasized that the main contribution of 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq was its impact on the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia. Many of the experts argued the invasion of Iraq was a necessary result of the fact that the old strategy of working with Saudi Arabia would no longer work after 9/11: [The US invaded to] allow the US to withdraw its troops from Saudi Arabia, which was the grievance listed by Al Qaeda. Those US troops were there to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq; as soon as the US invaded Iraq, the troops in Saudi Arabia were removed. One of Al Qaeda’s rallying cries was to get the Crusaders away from the two holy mosques in Saudi Arabia. The road out of Saudi Arabia was through Baghdad because that was the reason we had stationed 10,000 plus airmen, etc. in Saudi Arabia. The invasion of Iraq was in March. We left Saudi Arabia in August 2003. Not an airman still there ... [The US invaded Iraq] to grab the oil fields in case the Wahabis took charge in Saudi Arabia. [Among other reasons, the US invaded Iraq] to embark on a new policy that would still guarantee the flow of oil while distancing ourselves from Saudi Arabia controlling Iraqi oil would make the US less dependent on Saudi Arabia and so free the US for other initiatives. Still other experts argued the administration needed to act after 9/11 in order to restore American credibility or simply to “do something” in response to 9/11: The US invaded Iraq to restore American credibility after the September 11 attacks through a quick and decisive victory. The US invaded Iraq in order to appear to “do something” about the “terrorists,” even though there was no link. Thus, though there is little disagreement that 9/11 created the political opportunity for the administration to act; there is considerable disagreement about whether the events of 9/11 significantly changed the administration’s thinking or if the administration was already set on invading Iraq. Additionally, there is also significant disagreement about whether the administration changed its thinking primarily about the possible threat from Iraq, or if the administration more importantly changed its thinking about the US relationship with Saudi Arabia.

OVER THE PAST CENTURY: LEAD UP TO THE WAR IN 1980S

February 15, 1848: Lincoln: Pre-Emptive War Powers Make a President a KingsEL. In a letter to his law partner, William H. Herndon, Abraham Lincoln disagrees with Herndon's argument for preemptive war. "Allow the president to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion... and you allow him to make war at pleasure.... The provision of the Constitution giving the war making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always stood."

1917: British 'Liberate' Baghdad; Parallels to 2003 US 'Liberation'sEL . British forces invade Iraq and occupy Baghdad, ostensibly to save the Iraqis from the Ottoman Empire during World War I. In reality, the occupation is at least partly motivated by the desire to secure the Iraqi oil fields for Britain. Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude proclaims: "Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. You people of Baghdad are not to understand that it is the wish of the British government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British government that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws." Author and former CIA agent Larry Kolb will write in 2007: "That sounded a lot to me like the rosy assurances our own [American] leaders gave the Iraqis in 2003 not long after we flattened half of Baghdad and then drove our tanks into what was left of it. But history shows that eventually the British liberators were driven out of Iraq by pissed-off locals, the insurgency. Just as eventually British liberators were driven out of Palestine, by both Jews and Arabs. And just as Napoleon, the liberator of Egypt, had eventually been forced by the locals to abandon the Nile in humiliation. The track record of Western armies fighting local insurgencies is abysmal. If President Bush didn't know that, surely someone on his staff should have."

1918: British Secretary of War Writes That Control over Oil in Iraq and Iran Is 'a First Class British War Aim'sEL . In a letter to British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, Sir Maurice Hankey, Britain's First Secretary of the War Cabinet, writes, "Oil in the next war will occupy the place of coal in the present war, or at least a parallel place to coal. The only big potential supply that we can get under British control is the Persian [now Iran] and Mesopotamian [now Iraq] supply... Control over these oil supplies becomes a first class British war aim."

Early 1920: British Battle Fierce Insurgency in IraqsEL. Three years after Britain declared victory in Iraq ,their occupational forces are locked in fierce fighting with an Iraqi insurgency that had grown up in the Iraqi city of Fallujah. The British begin a campaign of aerial bombing against Fallujah and Baghdad, and heavy urban assaults in Samarra.

August 1920: British Announce Iraqi Insurgency Defeated; Intelligence Official Warns Otherwise ELBritish generals announce that the insurgency in Iraq has been defeated. But former British Army intelligence officer T. E. Lawrence—“Lawrence of Arabia”—disagrees, in a dispatch published by the London Times. “The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor,” Lawrence writes. “Things have been far worse than we have told. We are today not far from a disaster.” Lawrence knows the insurgents—indeed, he had helped train them in the techniques of guerrilla warfare.

October 30, 1944: Ahmed Chalabi Is Born into Elite Iraqi FamilysELAhmed Chalabi. On October 30, 1944, Ahmed Chalabi is born into a wealthy, oligarchic Shiite family with close ties to Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy. Chalabi’s mother runs political salons catering to Iraq’s elite and his father loans money to members of the ruling family who reward him with top posts in the government, which he uses to advance his business interests. His grandfather was also close to the monarchy, holding nine cabinet positions in government during his lifetime.. But it was Chalabi’s great grandfather who, as the tax farmer of Kadimiah, a town near Baghdad, established the family’s grand fortunes. According to Iraqi historian Hanna Batatu, Ahmed’s great grandfather was “a very harsh man, [who] kept a bodyguard of armed slaves and had a special prison at his disposal” where, according to a friend of Chalabi’s, he imprisoned serfs who failed to pay their taxes or produce wheat. “When he died the people of Kadimiah heaved a sigh of relief,” Batatu writes. In 1958, Chalabi’s family will flee Iraq when the Iraqi Communist Party overthrows the monarchy. Decades later, Imad Khadduri, a schoolmate of Chalabi’s, will say: “Ahmed wanted to avenge his father’s ouster and and the deprivation of his lands.... Now he’s trying to fit in his father’s shoes.”

1945: US State Department Official Calls Saudi Oil ‘One of the Greatest Material Prizes in World History’sEL('1626004942-16208','16208') The chief of the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs, writes in a memo that the oil resources of Saudi Arabia are a “stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.”

1947: British Paper States That Middle East Is a ‘Vital Prize’ for Any Power Seeking ‘Domination’Sel. An introductory paper on the Middle East put out by the British government states that the Middle East is “a vital prize for any power interested in world influence or domination.”

1950S: The first “Zippe-type” gas centrifuge, named after one of its main developers, German scientist Gernot Zippe, is produced. The centrifuge uses duralumin rotors. Centrifuge rotors are thin-walled tubes that spin at high speeds producing enriched uranium 235. Centrifuge rotors are highly sensitive and must be made from specialized high-strength material.

After the 1950s: The use of aluminum for rotors in gas centrifuges is discontinued. Other materials, such as maraging steel and carbon fiber, are used instead.

August 11, 1954: During a news conference, President Dwight D. Eisenhower answers a question about the idea of an American “preventative war” against Communism by saying the following: “All of us have heard this term ‘preventive war’ since the earliest days of Hitler. I recall that is about the first time I heard it. In this day and time, if we believe for one second that nuclear fission and fusion, that type of weapon, would be used in such a war—what is a preventive war? I would say a preventive war, if the words mean anything, is to wage some sort of quick police action in order that you might avoid a terrific cataclysm of destruction later. A preventive war, to my mind, is an impossibility today. How could you have one if one of its features would be several cities lying in ruins, several cities where many, many thousands of people would be dead and injured and mangled, the transportation systems destroyed, sanitation implements and systems all gone? That isn’t preventive war; that is war. I don’t believe there is such a thing; and, frankly, I wouldn’t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing.” After the 1958 coup that deposes King Faisal II of Iraq, Ahmed Chalabi, 13, and his family flee to Lebanon because of their close ties to the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy (see [October 30, 1944](#)). The young Ahmed then goes to England where he attends boarding school. Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile, studies for his doctorate in math at the University of Chicago where he gets to know Albert Wohlstetter, a prominent cold-war strategist and a mentor for Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. After receiving his degree, Chalabi moves to Lebanon where he works as a math teacher at the American University of Beirut. His brother, Jawad, is also living in Beirut and runs Middle East Banking Corp.

1963: The Chalabi family, with some local partners, found the Middle East Banking Corp. (Mebco)

1975: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signs a “Memorandum of Understanding” with Israel obligating the US to ensure the security of Israel’s oil reserves and energy supply in times of crisis. “The memorandum... [is] quietly renewed every five years” according to the London Observer, “with special legislation attached whereby the US stocks a strategic oil reserve for Israel even if it entail[s] domestic shortages—at a cost of \$3 billion in 2002 to US taxpayers.”

In the event that commercial shippers refuse to ship oil to Israel, the US is obligated to ship it using its own tankers.

1977: Ahmed Chalabi moves to Jordan where he founds Petra Bank. His partners include wealthy families from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

1979: Iraq imports 4,514 kilograms of natural uranium from Italy. The uranium is used in the Experimental Research Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication (ERLFF) for research and development related to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later finds that 191 kilograms of uranium is unaccounted for. In 1997, it will note, “This amount is less than the declared accumulation of ‘material unaccounted for’ and measured discards over the period 1982 to 1990 and

may be considered to be consistent with the nature of the facility operation.” The remainder is verified and controlled by the IAEA, at the “Location C” storage facility near the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq.

1979: Two years after its founding, Petra Bank, run by Ahmed Chalabi, is the second largest bank in Jordan. The bank’s success is attributed to the Chalabi family’s vast network of international connections which has enabled Petra to move money in and out of Jordan several steps ahead of the Jordan’s strict exchange controls. “They were far more efficient than the other banks,” a Jordanian businessman tells Salon. Chalabi’s bank lends money to several influential figures, including Prince Hasan, now a close acquaintance of Chalabi, to whom the bank lends \$30 million. Chalabi’s friendship with Hassan enables Petra to open a chain of branches in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

During this period, Petra bank even does business with Saddam Hussein, helping the dictator finance Iraqi trade with Jordan.

Iraq procures “yellowcake” uranium from Portugal, Niger, and Brazil. Since neither Niger nor Brazil are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they are not required to submit the transaction to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Portugal, a signatory to the treaty, informs the IAEA of the transfers. Iraq also notifies the IAEA of the transfer in August 1981 and again in July 1982. The total amount of yellowcake uranium secured by Iraq is 563,290 kilograms. The IAEA verifies the amount transferred to Iraq; including the loss of about 40 kilograms from a drum damaged during Iraq’s salvaging and concealment attempts in 1991. Like other uranium transferred to Iraq (see [1979](#) and [1982](#)), this uranium is verified and accounted for by International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors, and is kept at “Location C,” a storage complex near the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. Later inspections show that Iraq has not been fully honest about its uranium purchases; it is not until July 1991 that Iraq declares the full amount of uranium it has received. Furthermore, later inspections will show that “considerable” amounts of uranium cannot be accounted for. By July 1994, IAEA inspectors will verify the complete amounts and dispositions of Iraq’s yellowcake

Early 1980s: At this time, an engineer by the name of Joe Turner is working in the gas centrifuge program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. His work pertains not to actual centrifuges, but to the platforms upon which the centrifuges are installed

Iraq invades Iran, officially beginning a nine-year war between those two countries, though Iraq insists that Iran has been launching artillery attacks against Iraqi targets since September 4. The overarching reason, according to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, is over control of the Shatt al-Arab, the geographically critical waterway between Iran and Iraq that empties into the Persian Gulf. (Iraq signed over partial control of the Shatt al-Arab to Iran in 1975, but reclaimed the waterway in 1979 after the fall of Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi; Iraq also has hopes to conquer the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan.)

The United States will provide covert military support to both Iran (see [November 3, 1986](#)) and Iraq (see [1981-1988](#)) during the war.

Late 1980s: Iraq begins developing “Zippe-type” centrifuges (see [1950s](#)). The centrifuges use rotors made from maraging steel and carbon fiber, which are more advanced than aluminum and allow the rotor to spin at significantly higher speeds. But Iraq has problems building centrifuges—even with considerable assistance from German experts.

US and British companies are among several Western firms that sell Iraq materials that can be used to develop nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons

1981-1988: The Reagan administration provides covert support to Iraq in an effort to prevent Iran from overrunning the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. US Air Force officers are secretly deployed to Iraq to assist their counterparts in the Iraqi military. The US provides satellite photography to Iraq revealing the movements of the Iranian forces. The US provides Iraq with intelligence gathered by Saudi-owned AWACS operated by the Pentagon. Iraq uses US-supplied military intelligence “to calibrate attacks with mustard gas on Iranian ground troops....”

“More than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency.... secretly [provide] detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq.” President Reagan and Vice President George Bush personally deliver military advice to Saddam Hussein, both directly and through intermediaries. The US closely monitors “third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq [has] the military weaponry required.”

According to the censured portion of Iraq’s December 7, 2002 declaration to the UN . Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories help train Iraqi nuclear weapons scientists and provide nonfissile material for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.

June, 1981: Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin calls televangelist and nascent political ally Jerry Falwell (see [1980](#)) and says: “Tomorrow you’re going to read some strange things about what we’re going to do. But our safety is at stake. I wanted you, my good friend, to know what we are going to do.” Israel is preparing to use US-provided F-16s to destroy Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor (see [June 7, 1981](#)). Begin is concerned that the US will object to Israel’s use of the aircraft for non-defensive purposes. Falwell tells Begin, “I want to congratulate you for a mission that [makes] us very proud that we manufactured those F-16s.” Many Reagan officials are not happy that Israel violated the agreement with the US over use of the warplanes, but even though Vice President Bush and Chief of Staff James Baker both believe that Israel should be punished, Begin has provided himself cover on the Christian right.

On the order of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and after heated debate among Israeli leaders, Israeli warplanes strike the Osirak (also spelled Osiraq) Tammuz I nuclear plant at al-Tuwaitha near Baghdad, destroying it and dealing a severe setback to Iraq’s nuclear program. Israel claims it fears Iraq is building

a nuclear weapon with which to strike it. Osirak is a French-made nuclear reactor, which is near completion but lacks any nuclear fuel, thereby raising no danger of any radioactive link. Ariel Sharon, concurrently Defense Minister and a proponent of the strike, later says, "This was perhaps the most difficult decision which faced any [Israeli] government during all the years of the state's existence." The Israeli government states after the strike, "The atomic bombs which that reactor was capable of producing, whether from enriched uranium or from plutonium, would be of the Hiroshima size. Thus a mortal danger to the people of Israel progressively arose.... Under no circumstances will we allow an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people." The reactor is slated to be completed by September, 1981, though it would be years before it could produce any nuclear-grade fissionable material. Iraq denies the reactor is developed to produce nuclear weapons, though the construction of the plant gives credence to claims that Iraq is more interested in building a weapon than generating electricity. (After the strike, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein says, "Any state in the world which really wants peace... should help the Arabs in one way or another to acquire atomic bombs," giving further credence to suspicions that Hussein wanted to build a nuclear weapon.) The Israeli strike follows up a September 1980 raid on the Osirak facility by Iranian warplanes. Publicly, Iran and Israel are dire enemies, but Israel has begun secretly selling US-made arms to Iran as a way to counterbalance the threat posed by Iraq. 1984, Brookings Institution fellow Lucien Vandenbroucke will write, "Ironically, Israel's raid may prove to be a brilliant tactical success achieved at the expense of the country's long-term interests. Certainly, the attack set Iraq's nuclear program back several years. But the strike also ushered in a de facto Israeli claim to nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, a move that in the long run generally promises to encourage the larger Arab world on the nuclear path.... In the decision-making process, Israeli fears and the propensity to rely on worst-case analyses seem to have prevailed. The advocates of the strike focused on the unreasonable, rather than the reasonable, aspects of Iraqi behavior, and thus even a limited prospect that Iraq might soon acquire a nuclear bomb became more of a risk than they were prepared to accept."

1982: Iraq imports 1,767 kilograms of enriched uranium from Italy, and 6,005 kilograms of depleted uranium from Italy as well. As with its earlier uranium import from Italy, this uranium is verified and accounted for by International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors, and is kept at "Location C," a storage complex near the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. Reagan orders the Defense Department and the CIA to supply Iraq's military with intelligence information, advice, and hardware for battle after being advised to do so by CIA Director William Casey. Former Reagan national security official Howard Teicher will later reveal that Casey "personally spearheaded the effort to insure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war." The US will continue to provide this type of intelligence to Iraq until 1988.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a vehement opponent of the US's arms sales to Iran, concludes that if Iraq doesn't receive military aid, it will lose its war with Iran. Weinberger arranges the secret swap of a Soviet T-72 tank given to the Iraqi military in return for four US howitzers. Some Pentagon

intelligence officials covet the Soviet tank for the information they can glean about Soviet weaponry, but, according to two highly placed officials in the Reagan administration, Weinberger sees the deal as an opportunity to begin direct US arms shipments to Iraq. A Pentagon official explains in 1992, “Cap’s view was that once the first arms shipments to Iraq were authorized by the President, the first bite of the forbidden apple had been taken, and other direct covert arms sales to Iraq would follow.” However, the exchange falls through when the Iraqis, fearful that the Soviet Union will terminate its own military aid program, withdraws from the deal. A subsequent Iraqi offer to exchange a Soviet HIND helicopter also falls through when the Pentagon expresses its concerns over the criminal record of the middleman, a Lebanese-born international arms trafficker. However, Reagan and Defense Department officials continue to find ways to secretly supply arms to Iraq. Later, Weinberger will call the Iranian arms deals “insanity. How could you send arms to the Ayatollah when he was sworn to destroy us?” But Weinberger will be much less forthcoming about the US’s arms sales to Iraq, summed up under the sobriquet of “Iraqgate.” Weinberger will later claim that he is not involved in any arms deals with Iraq, and will say, “The little that I know was that it was all handled by the CIA. There might have been a role by some people in the Pentagon. But I didn’t keep a hand in that.” He will refuse to acknowledge the accuracy of Pentagon memos from 1982 and 1983 sent directly to him that outline proposals to arm Iraq. In a 1992 news article, reporters Murray Waas and Craig Unger note that Weinberger will repeatedly lie “without compunction” about his involvement in arms sales to Iraq over the coming years, and observe, “Whenever his credibility is questioned, Weinberger routinely invokes concerns for national security and hides behind a veil of secrecy.”

The Reagan administration—despite stern objections from Congress—removes Iraq from the US State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism in February 1982. President Reagan issues a national security directive which formalizes US policy toward the Iraq-Iran war, committing the US to continued support for Iraq to avoid an Iranian victory. The document is authored by National Security aides Howard Teicher and Geoff Kemp in June.

1983: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt supply Iraq with US howitzers, helicopters, bombs, and other weapons with the secret approval of the Reagan administration. Italy also funnels arms to Iraq at the insistence of President Reagan who personally made the request to Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Secretary of Commerce Howard Baldrige and Secretary of State George Shultz successfully lobby the National Security Council (NSC) adviser to approve the sale of 10 Bell helicopters to Iraq in spite of objections from other NSC members. It is claimed that the helicopters will be used for crop spraying. These same helicopters are later used in 1988 to deploy poison gas against Iranians and possibly Iraqi Kurds.

In October, William Eagleton, the chief of the US-interests section in Baghdad, writes a memo that asserts the US can secretly supply arms to Iraq for use against Iran through third-party nations. “We can selectively lift restrictions on third party transfers of US-licensed military equipment to Iraq,” he writes. Although Eagleton is not the architect of this policy—that is primarily Defense Secretary Caspar

Weinberger, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Shultz's assistant, Richard Murphy, who fear that Iran will lead a rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region—Eagleton's memo heralds the onset of US arms transfers to Iraq through several regional countries, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. The arms transfers are almost certainly illegal, a direct violation of the Arms Export Control Act, which directs the president to inform Congress if any such third-party arms transfers are enacted. Reagan officials decide not to inform Congress because they know Congress will never approve the arms transfers, particularly in light of the US's stated policy of neutrality towards the Iran-Iraq War. Congress also knows nothing of the Reagan administration's secret supplying of arms to Iran.

In November, US State Department official Jonathan T. Howe sends Secretary of Defense Lawrence Eagleburger a memo reporting that US intelligence has determined that "Iraq has acquired a CW [chemical weapons] production capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a US foreign subsidiary" and that Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iranian forces and Kurdish insurgents. Referring to the US policy "of seeking a halt to CW use wherever it occurs," Howe says the US is "considering" approaching Iraq directly, but in a way that avoids playing "into Iran's hands by fueling its propaganda against Iraq." Significantly, the memo acknowledges that the US has so far limited its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results."

US President Ronald Reagan issues National Security Directive 114 on the United States' policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The document—which makes no mention of Iraq's use of chemical weapons—calls for increased regional military cooperation to protect oil facilities and for improving US military capabilities in the region. The directive states, "Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic."

Special Envoy Donald Rumsfeld—formerly the Secretary of Defense and now the CEO of the pharmaceutical company, GD Searle and Co.—personally meets with Saddam Hussein for 90 minutes in an attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq. Rumsfeld also discusses US interest in the construction of the Iraq-Jordan Aqaba oil pipeline.

1984: The CIA secretly provides Iraqi intelligence with instructions on how to "calibrate" its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. Vice-President George H.W. Bush becomes involved in the Reagan administration's covert arming of Iraq, an operation which eventually comes to be known as "Iraqgate." There is no evidence to show that Bush knew about the Pentagon's efforts to arm Iraq through third parties, but subsequent aspects of the operation go through the National Security Planning Group, of which Bush is a member. According to participants in the group's meetings, Bush is a strong advocate of the Aqaba pipeline project and other aspects of the Reagan administration's covert tilt towards Iraq. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, the author of a secret policy memo detailing the administration's new and covert military support for Iraq (see [January 14, 1984](#)), meets with Iraq's

Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, in Baghdad. Murphy later describes Aziz as wearing olive-green fatigues, clenching a Cuban cigar between his teeth, and sporting a pearl-handled revolver. Aziz welcomes the covert arms supplies from the US, and is particularly interested in the proposed construction of an oil pipeline to run from Iraq to Jordan, very near the Israeli border. However, mindful of the recent destruction of Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak by the Israelis in January 1984.

US Secretary of Defense Lawrence Eagleburger meets with Iraqi diplomat Ismet Kattani to minimize the damage that the State Department's March 5 condemnation of Iraqi chemical warfare has caused to US-Iraqi relations. Secretary of State George Shultz is also present and later sends a cable to embassies in the Middle East with a summary of the meeting. "Eagleburger began the discussion by taking Kattani aside to emphasize the central message he wanted him to take back: our policy of firm opposition to the prohibited use of CW [chemical weapons] wherever it occurs necessitated our March 5 statement condemning Iraq's use of CW," the note explains. "The statement was not intended to provide fuel for Khomeini's propaganda war, nor to imply a shift in US policy toward Iran and Iraq. The US will continue its efforts to help prevent an Iranian victory, and earnestly wishes to continue the progress in its relations with Iraq. Iran presents a draft resolution to the UN which condemns Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The US delegate to the UN is instructed to push for a "no decision" on the resolution, or if not possible, cast an abstaining vote. Iraq's ambassador meets with the US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asks for "restraint" in responding to the issue of Iraq's use of chemical weapons in mid-March.

The US State Department briefs Donald Rumsfeld, who is preparing to make another visit to Baghdad. In a memo to Rumsfeld, Secretary of State George Shultz laments that relations with Iraq have soured because of the State Department's March 5 condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons and expresses considerable concern over the future of the Aqaba pipeline project [to be built by Bechtel which the US is pushing. Shultz writes: "Two event have worsened the atmosphere in Baghdad since your last stop there in December: (1) Iraq has only partly repulsed the initial thrust of a massive Iranian invasion, losing the strategically significant Majnun Island oil fields and accepting heavy casualties; (2) Bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW [chemical weapons] use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge [as a public issue] sooner or later. Given its wartime preoccupations and its distress at our CW statement, the Iraqi leadership probably will have little interest in discussing Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other matters except as they may impinge on Iraq's increasingly desperate struggle for survival. If Saddam or Tariq Aziz receives you against consider, and to reject, a pending application from Westinghouse to participate in a \$160 million portion of a \$1 billion Hyundai thermal power plant project in Iraq, this decision will only confirm Iraqi perceptions that ExIm [Export-Import Bank] financing for the Aqaba pipeline is out of the question. Eagleburger tried to put this perception to a rest, however, emphasizing to Kattani the administration's firm support for the line. The door is not yet closed to ExIm or other USG [US government] financial assistance to this project...." At the very end of the cable, it is noted that "Iraq

officials have professed to be at a loss to explain our actions as measured against our stated objectives. As with our CW statement, their temptation is to give up rational analysis and retreat to the line that US policies are basically anti-Arab and hostage to the desires of Israel.”

During a meeting in Jordan, Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon and US diplomat James Placke discuss a proposed draft resolution that Iran presented to the UN Security Council calling on the international body to condemn Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Hamdoon tells Placke that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential statement in lieu of a resolution, adding that the statement should (1) “mention former resolutions of the war”; (2) include a “strong call for progress toward ending the war through ceasefire or negotiations”; and (3) not identify any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke says that he will honor the request but asks that Iraq halt its purchasing of chemical weapons from US suppliers so as not to “embarrass” the US. Placke also warns that the US would be implementing licensing requirements on five chemical compounds for both Iraq and Iran. Placke says that the US does not want to be the “source of supply for anything that could contribute to the production of CW,” but adds reassuringly that the US does “not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship.” During a meeting in Jordan, Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon and US diplomat James Placke discuss a proposed draft resolution that Iran presented to the UN Security Council calling on the international body to condemn Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Hamdoon tells Placke that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential statement in lieu of a resolution, adding that the statement should (1) “mention former resolutions of the war”; (2) include a “strong call for progress toward ending the war through ceasefire or negotiations”; and (3) not identify any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke says that he will honor the request but asks that Iraq halt its purchasing of chemical weapons from US suppliers so as not to “embarrass” the US. Placke also warns that the US would be implementing licensing requirements on five chemical compounds for both Iraq and Iran. Placke says that the US does not want to be the “source of supply for anything that could contribute to the production of CW,” but adds reassuringly that the US does “not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship.” In May.

In September and October, A Defense Intelligence Agency report concludes that Iraq will probably “continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons.” The Reagan and Bush administrations’ Commerce Departments allow US companies and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to export chemical and biological agents as well as other dual-use items to Iraq, despite the country’s known record of using chemical weapons. According to government regulations, the Commerce Department must send applications for export licenses which involve items related to national security to the appropriate US government agencies for review. Reviewing agencies include the State Department, Department of Defense, Energy Department, and Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination. But in many cases, the Commerce Department either does not send national security-related applications to these agencies for review, or if it does, it overrides a review agency’s recommendation not to grant a license, allowing the item to be exported

anyway. Senate Committee Reports that will be completed in 1994, one on May 25 and another on October 7, dual-use chemical and biological agents exported to Iraq from the US significantly contributed to the country's weapons arsenal. The initial May report will say the agents "were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction" and the October report will reveal that the "microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and removed from the Iraqi biological warfare program." The 1994 investigation also determines that other exports such as plans and equipment also contributed significantly to Iraq's military capabilities. "UN inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development program," Donald Riegle, the chairman of the committee, will explain. He also says that between January 1985 and August 1990, the "executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology. The Reagan administration formally restores diplomatic relations with Iraq. The US had broken off relations with Iraq in 1967. Administration officials, who are already involved in secretly supplying military aid to Iraq for use against Iran, ignore allegations that Iraq is using lethal chemical weapons against Iranian troops, including mustard gas and fungal poisons. Administration officials will later claim that no one had any idea that those allegations were true, but according to a government official, the administration has indeed known of the Iraqis' use of chemical weapons for over a year by this time. Officials have privately chided Iraq for its use of such weapons, but Reagan officials continue to press forward with the administration's agenda of increased economic and military cooperation even though the Iraqis ignore the US's protests against the use of chemical weapons.

1985: US Secretary of State George Shultz successfully convinces Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) to drop a House bill that would have put Iraq back on the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism. Shultz's argument is that the United States is actively engaged in "diplomatic dialogue on this and other sensitive issues." He asserts that "Iraq has effectively distanced itself from international terrorism" and insists that if the US discovers any evidence implicating Iraq in the support of terrorist groups, the US government "would promptly return Iraq to the list."

1986: US intelligence learns that Iraq's Saad 16 research center is attempting to develop ballistic missiles. This information is relayed by the Defense Department's Undersecretary for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, to the Commerce Department's (CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration. In spite of this, the Commerce Department will subsequently approve more than \$1 million in computer sales to the Iraqi research center over the next four years. In 1991, the House Committee on Government Operations will report that 40 percent of the equipment at the Saad 16 research center had come from the US. Shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal is first revealed in the press, CIA Director William J. Casey meets with Iraq's ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, a second time and assures him that the new Washington-Baghdad intelligence link will remain open.

1987: and authors Laurie Mylroie and Daniel Pipes write an article for the New Republic entitled “Back Iraq: Time for a US Tilt in the Mideast.” Mylroie and Pipes argue that the US must publicly embrace Saddam Hussein’s secular dictatorship as a bulwark against the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran. Backing Iraq “could lay the basis for a fruitful relationship” that would benefit US and Israeli interests, they write. They believe Washington should move to a closer relationship with Hussein because Iraq holds a more moderate view of Israel and the US than other countries in the Middle East. “The American weapons that Iraq could make good use of include remotely scatterable and anti-personnel mines and counterartillery radar.” Mylroie and Pipes argue not just for weapons sales to Iraq.

1987: One batch each of salmonella and E coli is sent to the Iraqi State Company for Drug Industries with the approval of the US Department of Commerce.

1988: The US increases the amount of military intelligence it provides Iraq, a significant portion of which is channeled to the Iraqis through the CIA’s Baghdad office.

The US provides Baghdad with \$500 million in credits to buy American farm products.

Iraq purchases enriched uranium from South Africa, with a “green light” from the US, according to a later claim by the BBC. South Africa has had a covert nuclear weapons program since 1973, and will continue working on nuclear devices, and perhaps supplying Iraq and other nations with uranium, until 1989, when it will dismantle its nuclear weapons program and decommission its nuclear enrichment plants. The BBC television news program *Correspondent* will claim in 2001 that according to Iraqi defectors, including a nuclear engineer and an assistant to Saddam Hussein’s son Uday Hussein, South Africa quietly shipped some 50 kilograms of uranium to Iraq for its nuclear weapons program. The BBC program will cite an anonymous South African intelligence official as one of its sources. “The story is true,” he will say. “About 50 kilograms were sold to the Iraqis. The Americans gave the green light for the deal.”

The US Commerce Department allows the export of equipment to Iraq for its SCUD missile program, allowing the Iraqis to increase the range of its SCUD missiles.

According to several accounts, Iraq uses US-supplied Bell helicopters to deploy chemical weapons during its campaign to recapture lost territories in its war with Iran. One of the towns that is within the conflict zone is the Kurdish village of Halabja, with a population of about 70,000. Between 3,200 and 5,000 Halabja civilians are reportedly killed by poison gas. Other accounts, however, suggest that Iranian gas is responsible for the attack on Halabja, a version that is promoted by the Reagan administration in order to divert the blame away from Iraq. Some believe the US version of the Halabja massacre is “cooked up in the Pentagon.” A declassified State Department document “demonstrate[s] that US diplomats received instructions to press this line with US allies, and to decline to discuss the details.”

A US delegation travels to Turkey at the request of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and confirms that Iraq is “using chemical weapons on its Kurdish population.”

The United Nations sends a delegation of experts to the Iraq-Iran War conflict zone to investigate Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. However, Baghdad refuses to cooperate and the US makes no serious attempt to press Baghdad to comply with the UN Security Council’s decision. US Secretary of State George Shultz downplays the charges against Iraq, arguing that interviews with Kurdish refugees in Turkey and “other sources” do not conclusively support the allegations being made against Saddam Hussein’s government.

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein begins the first of a series of poison-gas attacks on Kurdish villages inside Iraq. A September 1988 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states: “Those who were very close to the bombs died instantly. Those who did not die instantly found it difficult to breathe and began to vomit. The gas stung the eyes, skin, and lungs of the villagers exposed to it. Many suffered temporary blindness... .

Those who could not run from the growing smell, mostly the very old and the very young, died.” While the gas attacks are continuing, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead circulates a highly classified memo among senior State Department officials recommending that the US cultivate even closer ties with Iraq, whom it supported over Iran in the last few years of the war. Whitehead offers a Cold War rationale: “[Soviet] clout and influence is on a steady rise as the Gulf Arabs gain self-confidence and Soviet diplomacy gains in sophistication.

The Soviets have strong cards to play: their border with Iran and their arms-supply relationship with Iraq. They will continue to be major players and we should engage them as fully as possible.” Whitehead adds, “It should be remembered... that we have weathered Irangate”. More must be done to develop closer ties with “the ruthless but pragmatic Saddam Hussein.”

The US grants 65 licenses for dual-use technology exports for Iraq. On average, the US is now granting 260 such licenses per year, more than double the rate of licenses granted between January and August 1988.

Veteran diplomat Joseph Wilson arrives in Baghdad to assume the post of Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) under US Ambassador April Glaspie. Wilson has extensive experience throughout sub-Saharan and Central Africa, as well as brief stints on the staffs of Senator Al Gore (D-TN) and Representative Tom Foley (D-WA). Wilson will later write that he and his colleagues share the belief that Iraq is ruled by “a shockingly brutal regime... an ugly totalitarian dictatorship” and its leader, Saddam Hussein, a “sociopath”. In a memo regarding the issue of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy writes, “The US-Iraqi relationship is... important to our long term political and economic objectives. We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive”. The US Senate unanimously passes the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, which makes Iraq ineligible to

receive US loans, military and non-military assistance, credits, credit guarantees and items subject to export controls. It also makes it illegal for the US to import Iraqi oil.

Immediately after the bill is passed by the Senate, the Reagan administration launches a campaign to prevent its passage in the House. With the help of its allies in the House, the administration succeeds in killing the bill on the last day of the legislative session. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirms reports that between 1984 and 1988 "Iraq repeatedly and effectively used poison gas on Iran."

KEY DOCUMENTS

HANS BLIX'S BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON FEBRUARY 14, 2003.

Mr. President, Since I reported to the Security Council on 27 January, UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total period of inspections so far to 11 weeks. Since then, we have also listened on 5 February to the presentation to the Council by the US Secretary of State and the discussion that followed. Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on 8 and 9 February. Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.

We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully operational. With the resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has improved. We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters. The number of Iraqi minders during inspections had often reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about one to one. The situation has improved. Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.

The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining activities were performed. This included the identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples and discussions with the site personnel regarding past and present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or buried equipment. Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability but, as before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002.

More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been screened using our own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC). The results to date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations.

We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One-third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found at another site, has also been destroyed.

The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 15 IAEA inspectors, 50 aircrew, and 65 support staff. Mr. President, In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to Presidential sites and private residences.

In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on a firm course. Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors. In the words of resolution 1441 (2002) - it requires immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of disarmament - either by presenting remaining proscribed items and programmes for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated. In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the Government of South Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons programme, by a wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for further talks. How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed items and programmes? So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed. Another matter - and one of great significance - is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented. We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programmes continue to exist. The US Secretary of State presented material in support of this conclusion. Governments have many sources of information that are not available to inspectors. Inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only on evidence, which they can, themselves, examine and present publicly. Without evidence, confidence cannot arise.

Mr. President, In my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that such issues "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside...". The declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December last year, despite its large volume, missed the

opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions. This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.

In my January update to the Council, I referred to the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared to UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the 150-kilometre limit set by the Security Council. I also noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed a technical review. Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts from a number of Member States to discuss these items. The experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring plan adopted by resolution 715 (1991). As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile system could be fully assessed. With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers, which had been intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile system. Iraq has declared that it has reconstituted these chambers. The experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres. Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.

The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity. On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the export/import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing that these engines were intended for use in the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured for use in this missile system would also be proscribed. I intend to communicate these findings to the Government of Iraq.

At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and gave us a number of papers, e.g. regarding anthrax and growth material, the nerve agent VX and missile production. Experts who were present from our side studied the papers during the evening of 8 February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February for further clarifications. Although no new evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues were closed through them or the expert discussions, the presentation of the papers could be indicative of a more active attitude focusing on important open issues. The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled through certain technical and analytical methods. Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions, they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of material poured into the ground years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by staff that dealt with the items still appears to be needed.

Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February from Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance. It presents a list of 83 names of participants "in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which took place in the summer of 1991". As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed "unaccounted for", the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the the actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance. I trust that the Iraqi side will put together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the unilateral destruction of other proscribed items, notably in the biological field. The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed items. This was welcomed.

A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even private houses.

The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with proscribed items to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They evidently need to work fast and effectively to convince us, and the world, that it is a serious effort. The matter of private interviews was discussed at length during our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the commitment, which it made to us on 20 January, to encourage persons asked to accept such interviews, whether in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had interviews in Baghdad. A number of persons have declined to be interviewed, unless they were allowed to have an official present or were allowed to tape the interview. Three persons that had previously refused interviews on UN MOVIC's terms, subsequently accepted such interviews just prior to our talks in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February. These interviews proved informative. No further interviews have since been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change. We feel that interviews conducted without any third party present and without tape recording would provide the greatest credibility. At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier occasions, my colleague Dr. ElBaradei and I have urged the Iraqi side to enact legislation implementing the UN prohibitions regarding weapons of mass destruction. This morning we had a message that a Presidential decree has now been issued containing prohibitions with regard to importation and production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We have not yet had time to study the details of the text of the decree. Mr. President, I should like to make some comments on the role of intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq. A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide full cooperation on "process" - granting immediate access everywhere to inspectors - and on substance, providing full declarations supported by relevant information and material and evidence. However, with the closed society in Iraq of today and the history of inspections there, other sources of information, such as defect ctors and government intelligence agencies are required to aid the inspection process. I remember myself how, in 1991, several inspections in Iraq, which were based on information received from a Government, helped to disclose important parts of the nuclear weapons programme. It was realized that an international organization authorized to perform inspections anywhere on the ground could make good use of information obtained from governments with eyes in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors, and both eyes and ears on the market for weapons-related material. It was understood that the information residing in the intelligence services of governments could come to very active use in the international effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

International organizations need to analyse such information critically and especially benefit when it comes from more than one source. The intelligence agencies, for their part, must protect their sources and methods. Those who provide such information must know that it will be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few people. UNMOVIC has achieved good working relations with intelligence agencies and the amount of information provided has been gradually increasing. However, we must recognize that there are limitations and that misinterpretations can occur. Intelligence information has been useful for UNMOVIC. In one case, it led us to a private home where documents mainly relating to laser enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases, intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other items - conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction. The presentation of intelligence information by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection. Our reservation on this point does not detract from our appreciation of the briefing. Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the Iraqi authorities of its intention to start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft early next week under arrangements similar to those UNSCOM had followed. We are also in the process of working out modalities for the use of the French Mirage aircraft starting late next week and for the drones supplied by the German Government. The offer from Russia of an Antonov aircraft, with night vision capabilities, is a welcome one and is next on our agenda for further improving UNMOVIC's and IAEA's technical capabilities. These developments are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper recently circulated by France, suggesting a further strengthening of the inspection capabilities. It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent intelligence reports for instance about mobile biological weapons production units, such measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections. UNMOVIC is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of numbers of staff and technical resources. On my way to the recent Baghdad meeting, I stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts, who had just completed our general training course for inspectors. They came from 22 countries, including Arab countries. Mr. President, UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it needs to complete its task in Iraq. The answer depends upon which task one has in mind - the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related items and programmes, which were prohibited in 1991 - the disarmament task - or the monitoring that no new proscribed activities occur. The latter task, though not often focused upon, is highly significant - and not controversial. It will require monitoring, which is "ongoing", that is, open-ended until the Council decides otherwise. By contrast, the task of "disarmament" foreseen in resolution 687 (1991) and the progress on "key remaining disarmament tasks" foreseen in resolution 1284 (1999) as well as the "disarmament obligations", which Iraq was given a "final opportunity to comply with" under resolution 1441 (2002), were always required to be fulfilled in a shorter time span. Regrettably, the high degree of cooperation required of Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not forthcoming in 1991. Despite the elimination, under UNSCOM

and IAEA supervision, of large amounts of weapons, weapons-related items and installations over the years, the task remained incomplete, when inspectors were withdrawn almost 8 years later at the end of 1998. If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament - under resolution 687 (1991) - could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short, if "immediate, active and unconditional cooperation" with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming.

ROBIN COOK'S RESIGNATION SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT OVER IRAQ WAR

This is the first time for 20 years that I have addressed the House from the Back Benches. I must confess that I had forgotten how much better the view is from here. None of those 20 years were more enjoyable or more rewarding than the past two, in which I have had the immense privilege of serving this House as Leader of the House, which were made all the more enjoyable, Mr. Speaker, by the opportunity of working closely with you. It was frequently the necessity for me as Leader of the House to talk my way out of accusations that a statement had been preceded by a press interview. On this occasion I can say with complete confidence that no press interview has been given before this statement. I have chosen to address the House first on why I cannot support a war without international agreement or domestic support. The present Prime Minister is the most successful leader of the Labour party in my lifetime. I hope that he will continue to be the leader of our party, and I hope that he will continue to be successful. I have no sympathy with, and I will give no comfort to, those who want to use this crisis to displace him. I applaud the heroic efforts that the Prime Minister has made in trying to secure a second resolution. I do not think that anybody could have done better than the Foreign Secretary in working to get support for a second resolution within the Security Council. But the very intensity of those attempts underlines how important it was to succeed. Now that those attempts have failed, we cannot pretend that getting a second resolution was of no importance. France has been at the receiving end of bucketloads of commentary in recent days. It is not France alone that wants more time for inspections. Germany wants more time for inspections; Russia wants more time for inspections; indeed, at no time have we signed up even the minimum necessary to carry a second resolution. We delude ourselves if we think that the degree of international hostility is all the result of President Chirac. The reality is that Britain is being asked to embark on a war without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partner—not NATO, not the European Union and, now, not the Security Council. To end up in such diplomatic weakness is a serious reverse. Only a year ago, we and the United States were part of a coalition against terrorism that was wider and more diverse than I would ever have imagined possible. History will be astonished at the diplomatic miscalculations that led so quickly to the disintegration of that powerful coalition. The US can afford to go it alone, but Britain is not a superpower. Our interests are best protected not by unilateral action but by multilateral agreement and a world order governed by rules. Yet tonight the international partnerships most important to us are weakened: the European Union is divided; the Security Council is in stalemate. Those are heavy casualties of a war in which a shot has yet to be fired. I have heard some parallels between military action in these circumstances and the military action that we took in Kosovo. There was no doubt about the multilateral support that we had for the action that we took in Kosovo. It was supported by NATO; it was supported by the European Union; it was supported by

every single one of the seven neighbours in the region. France and Germany were our active allies. It is precisely because we have none of that support in this case that it was all the more important to get agreement in the Security Council as the last hope of demonstrating international agreement. The legal basis for our action in Kosovo was the need to respond to an urgent and compelling humanitarian crisis. Our difficulty in getting support this time is that neither the international community nor the British public is persuaded that there is an urgent and compelling reason for this military action in Iraq. The threshold for war should always be high. None of us can predict the death toll of civilians from the forthcoming bombardment of Iraq, but the US warning of a bombing campaign that will "shock and awe" makes it likely that casualties will be numbered at least in the thousands. I am confident that British servicemen and women will acquit themselves with professionalism and with courage. I hope that they all come back. I hope that Saddam, even now, will quit Baghdad and avert war, but it is false to argue that only those who support war support our troops. It is entirely legitimate to support our troops while seeking an alternative to the conflict that will put those troops at risk. Nor is it fair to accuse those of us who want longer for inspections of not having an alternative strategy. For four years as Foreign Secretary I was partly responsible for the western strategy of containment. Over the past decade that strategy destroyed more weapons than in the Gulf war, dismantled Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and halted Saddam's medium and long-range missiles programmes. Iraq's military strength is now less than half its size than at the time of the last Gulf war. Ironically, it is only because Iraq's military forces are so weak that we can even contemplate its invasion. Some advocates of conflict claim that Saddam's forces are so weak, so demoralised and so badly equipped that the war will be over in a few days. We cannot base our military strategy on the assumption that Saddam is weak and at the same time justify pre-emptive action on the claim that he is a threat. Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term—namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target. It probably still has biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold Saddam anthrax agents and the then British Government approved chemical and munitions factories. Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for 20 years, and which we helped to create? Why is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam's ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors? Only a couple of weeks ago, Hans Blix told the Security Council that the key remaining disarmament tasks could be completed within months. I have heard it said that Iraq has had not months but 12 years in which to complete disarmament, and that our patience is exhausted. Yet it is more than 30 years since resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. We do not express the same impatience with the persistent refusal of Israel to comply. I welcome the strong personal commitment that the Prime Minister has given to middle east peace, but Britain's positive role in the middle east does not redress the strong sense of injustice throughout the Muslim world at what it sees as one rule for the allies of the US and another rule for the rest. Nor is our credibility helped by the appearance that our partners in Washington are less interested in disarmament than they are in regime change in Iraq. That explains why any evidence that inspections may be showing progress is greeted in Washington not with satisfaction but with consternation: it reduces the case for war. What has come to trouble me most over past weeks is the suspicion that if the hanging chads in Florida had gone the other way and Al Gore had been elected, we would now be about to commit British troops. The longer that I have served in this place, the greater the respect I have for the good sense and collective wisdom of the

British people. On Iraq, I believe that the prevailing mood of the British people is sound. They do not doubt that Saddam is a brutal dictator, but they are not persuaded that he is a clear and present danger to Britain. They want inspections to be given a chance, and they suspect that they are being pushed too quickly into conflict by a US Administration with an agenda of its own. Above all, they are uneasy at Britain going out on a limb on a military adventure without a broader international coalition and against the hostility of many of our traditional allies. From the start of the present crisis, I have insisted, as Leader of the House, on the right of this place to vote on whether Britain should go to war. It has been a favourite theme of commentators that this House no longer occupies a central role in British politics. Nothing could better demonstrate that they are wrong than for this House to stop the commitment of troops in a war that has neither international agreement nor domestic support. I intend to join those tomorrow night who will vote against military action now. It is for that reason, and for that reason alone, and with a heavy heart, that I resign from the Government.

UN RESOLUTION 1538 PASSED ON APRIL 21, 2004

The Security Council,

Expressing the desire to see a full and fair investigation of efforts by the former Government of Iraq, including through bribery, kickbacks, surcharges on oil sales, and illicit payments in regard to purchases of humanitarian goods, to evade the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 and subsequent relevant resolutions;

Concerned by public news reports and commentaries that have called into question the administration and management of the Oil-for-food Programme (hereinafter the Programme) established pursuant to resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995 and subsequent relevant resolutions, including allegations of fraud and corruption;

Affirming that any illicit activity by United Nations officials, personnel and agents, as well as contractors, including entities that have entered into contracts under the Programme, is unacceptable;

Emphasizing the importance of full cooperation with the independent high-level inquiry by all United Nations officials and personnel, the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq , and all other Member States ;

Affirming the letter of its President of 31 March 2004 welcoming the Secretary-General's decision to create an independent high-level inquiry to investigate the administration and management of the Programme and taking note of the details relating to its organization and terms of reference;

Welcomes the appointment of the independent high-level inquiry;

Calls upon the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq , and all other Member States , including their national regulatory authorities, to cooperate fully by all appropriate means with the inquiry;

Looks forward to receiving the inquiry's final report;
Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH'S SPEECH PRESENTED IN THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 21, 2004.

Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for the honor of addressing this General Assembly. The American people respect the idealism that gave life to this organization. And we respect the men and women of the U.N., who stand for peace and human rights in every part of the world. Welcome to New York City, and welcome to the United States of America.

During the past three years, I've addressed this General Assembly in a time of tragedy for my country, and in times of decision for all of us. Now we gather at a time of tremendous opportunity for the U.N. and for all peaceful nations. For decades, the circle of liberty and security and development has been expanding in our world. This progress has brought unity to Europe, self-government to Latin America and Asia, and new hope to Africa. Now we have the historic chance to widen the circle even further, to fight radicalism and terror with justice and dignity, to achieve a true peace, founded on human freedom.

The United Nations and my country share the deepest commitments. Both the American Declaration of Independence and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaim the equal value and dignity of every human life. That dignity is honored by the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, protection of private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance. That dignity is dishonored by oppression, corruption, tyranny, bigotry, terrorism and all violence against the innocent. And both of our founding documents affirm that this bright line between justice and injustice -- between right and wrong -- is the same in every age, and every culture, and every nation.

Wise governments also stand for these principles for very practical and realistic reasons. We know that dictators are quick to choose aggression, while free nations strive to resolve differences in peace. We know that oppressive governments support terror, while free governments fight the terrorists in their midst. We know that free peoples embrace progress and life, instead of becoming the recruits for murderous ideologies.

Every nation that wants peace will share the benefits of a freer world. And every nation that seeks peace has an obligation to help build that world. Eventually,

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there is no safe isolation from terror networks, or failed states that shelter them, or outlaw regimes, or weapons of mass destruction. Eventually, there is no safety in looking away, seeking the quiet life by ignoring the struggles and oppression of others.

In this young century, our world needs a new definition of security. Our security is not merely found in spheres of influence, or some balance of power. The security of our world is found in the advancing rights of mankind.

These rights are advancing across the world -- and across the world, the enemies of human rights are responding with violence. Terrorists and their allies believe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Bill of Rights, and every charter of liberty ever written, are lies, to be burned and destroyed and forgotten. They believe that dictators should control every mind and tongue in the Middle East and beyond. They believe that suicide and torture and murder are fully justified to serve any goal they declare. And they act on their beliefs.

In the last year alone, terrorists have attacked police stations, and banks, and commuter trains, and synagogues -- and a school filled with children. This month in Beslan we saw, once again, how the terrorists measure their success -- in the death of the innocent, and in the pain of grieving families. Svetlana Dzebisov was held hostage, along with her son and her nephew -- her nephew did not survive. She recently visited the cemetery, and saw what she called the "little graves." She said, "I understand that there is evil in the world. But what have these little creatures done?"

Members of the United Nations, the Russian children did nothing to deserve such awful suffering, and fright, and death. The people of Madrid and Jerusalem and Istanbul and Baghdad have done nothing to deserve sudden and random murder. These acts violate the standards of justice in all cultures, and the principles of all religions. All civilized nations are in this struggle together, and all must fight the murderers.

We're determined to destroy terror networks wherever they operate, and the United States is grateful to every nation that is helping to seize terrorist assets, track down their operatives, and disrupt their plans. We're determined to end the state sponsorship of terror -- and my nation is grateful to all that participated in the liberation of Afghanistan. We're determined to prevent proliferation, and to enforce the demands of the world -- and my nation is grateful to the soldiers of many nations who have helped to deliver the Iraqi people from an outlaw dictator.

The dictator agreed in 1991, as a condition of a cease-fire, to fully comply with all Security Council resolutions -- then ignored more than a decade of those resolutions.

Finally, the Security Council promised serious consequences for his defiance. And the commitments we make must have meaning. When we say "serious consequences," for the sake of peace, there must be serious consequences. And so a coalition of nations enforced the just demands of the world.

Defending our ideals is vital, but it is not enough. Our broader mission as U.N. members is to apply these ideals to the great issues of our time. Our wider goal is to promote hope and progress as the alternatives to hatred and violence. Our great purpose is to build a better world beyond the war on terror.

Because we believe in human dignity, America and many nations have established a global fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. In three years the contributing countries have funded projects in more than 90 countries, and pledged a total of \$5.6 billion to these efforts. America has undertaken a \$15 billion effort to provide prevention and treatment and humane care in nations afflicted by AIDS, placing a special focus on 15 countries where the need is most urgent. AIDS is the greatest health crisis of our time, and our unprecedented commitment will bring new hope to those who have walked too long in the shadow of death.

Because we believe in human dignity, America and many nations have joined together to confront the evil of trafficking in human beings. We're supporting organizations that rescue the victims, passing stronger anti-trafficking laws, and warning travelers that they will be held to account for supporting this modern form of slavery. Women and children should never be exploited for pleasure or greed, anywhere on Earth.

Because we believe in human dignity, we should take seriously the protection of life from exploitation under any pretext. In this session, the U.N. will consider a resolution sponsored by Costa Rica calling for a comprehensive ban on human cloning. I support that resolution and urge all governments to affirm a basic ethical principle: No human life should ever be produced or destroyed for the benefit of another.

Because we believe in human dignity, America and many nations have changed the way we fight poverty, curb corruption, and provide aid. In 2002 we created the Monterrey Consensus, a bold approach that links new aid from developed nations to real reform in developing ones. And through the Millennium Challenge Account, my nation is increasing our aid to developing nations that expand economic freedom and invest in the education and health of their own people.

Because we believe in human dignity, America and many nations have acted to lift the crushing burden of debt that limits the growth of developing economies, and holds millions of people in poverty. Since these efforts began in 1996, poor countries

with the heaviest debt burdens have received more than \$30 billion of relief. And to prevent the build-up of future debt, my country and other nations have agreed that international financial institutions should increasingly provide new aid in the form of grants, rather than loans.

Because we believe in human dignity, the world must have more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing. We must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises. The United States and Italy have proposed a Global Peace Operations Initiative. G-8 countries will train 75,000 peacekeepers, initially from Africa, so they can conduct operations on that continent and elsewhere. The countries of the G-8 will help this peacekeeping force with deployment and logistical needs.

At this hour, the world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded are genocide. The United States played a key role in efforts to broker a cease-fire, and we're providing humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people. Rwanda and Nigeria have deployed forces in Sudan to help improve security so aid can be delivered. The Security Council adopted a new resolution that supports an expanded African Union force to help prevent further bloodshed, and urges the government of Sudan to stop flights by military aircraft in Darfur. We congratulate the members of the Council on this timely and necessary action. I call on the government of Sudan to honor the cease-fire it signed, and to stop the killing in Darfur.

Because we believe in human dignity, peaceful nations must stand for the advance of democracy. No other system of government has done more to protect minorities, to secure the rights of labor, to raise the status of women, or to channel human energy to the pursuits of peace. We've witnessed the rise of democratic governments in predominantly Hindu and Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish and Christian cultures. Democratic institutions have taken root in modern societies, and in traditional societies. When it comes to the desire for liberty and justice, there is no clash of civilizations. People everywhere are capable of freedom, and worthy of freedom.

Finding the full promise of representative government takes time, as America has found in two centuries of debate and struggle. Nor is there any -- only one form of representative government -- because democracies, by definition, take on the unique character of the peoples that create them. Yet this much we know with certainty: The desire for freedom resides in every human heart. And that desire cannot be contained forever by prison walls, or martial laws, or secret police. Over time, and across the Earth, freedom will find a way.

Freedom is finding a way in Iraq and Afghanistan -- and we must

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continue to show our commitment to democracies in those nations. The liberty that many have won at a cost must be secured. As members of the United Nations, we all have a stake in the success of the world's newest democracies.

Not long ago, outlaw regimes in Baghdad and Kabul threatened the peace and sponsored terrorists. These regimes destabilized one of the world's most vital -- and most volatile -- regions. They brutalized their peoples, in defiance of all civilized norms. Today, the Iraqi and Afghan people are on the path to democracy and freedom. The governments that are rising will pose no threat to others. Instead of harboring terrorists, they're fighting terrorist groups. And this progress is good for the long-term security of us all.

The Afghan people are showing extraordinary courage under difficult conditions. They're fighting to defend their nation from Taliban holdouts, and helping to strike against the terrorists killers. They're reviving their economy. They've adopted a constitution that protects the rights of all, while honoring their nation's most cherished traditions. More than 10 million Afghan citizens -- over 4 million of them women -- are now registered to vote in next month's presidential election. To any who still would question whether Muslim societies can be democratic societies, the Afghan people are giving their answer.

Since the last meeting of this General Assembly, the people of Iraq have regained sovereignty. Today, in this hall, the Prime Minister of Iraq and his delegation represent a country that has rejoined the community of nations. The government of Prime Minister Allawi has earned the support of every nation that believes in self-determination and desires peace. And under Security Council resolutions 1511 and 1546, the world is providing that support. The U.N., and its member nations, must respond to Prime Minister Allawi's request, and do more to help build an Iraq that is secure, democratic, federal, and free.

A democratic Iraq has ruthless enemies, because terrorists know the stakes in that country. They know that a free Iraq in the heart of the Middle East will be a decisive blow against their ambitions for that region. So a terrorists group associated with al Qaeda is now one of the main groups killing the innocent in Iraq today -- conducting a campaign of bombings against civilians, and the beheadings of bound men. Coalition forces now serving in Iraq are confronting the terrorists and foreign fighters, so peaceful nations around the world will never have to face them within our own borders.

Our coalition is standing beside a growing Iraqi security force. The NATO Alliance is providing vital training to that force. More than 35 nations have contributed money and expertise to help rebuild Iraq's infrastructure. And as the Iraqi interim government moves toward national elections, officials from the United Nations are

helping Iraqis build the infrastructure of democracy. These selfless people are doing heroic work, and are carrying on the great legacy of Sergio de Mello.

As we have seen in other countries, one of the main terrorist goals is to undermine, disrupt, and influence election outcomes. We can expect terrorist attacks to escalate as Afghanistan and Iraq approach national elections. The work ahead is demanding. But these difficulties will not shake our conviction that the future of Afghanistan and Iraq is a future of liberty. The proper response to difficulty is not to retreat, it is to prevail.

The advance of freedom always carries a cost, paid by the bravest among us. America mourns the losses to our nation, and to many others. And today, I assure every friend of Afghanistan and Iraq, and every enemy of liberty: We will stand with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq until their hopes of freedom and security are fulfilled.

These two nations will be a model for the broader Middle East, a region where millions have been denied basic human rights and simple justice. For too long, many nations, including my own, tolerated, even excused, oppression in the Middle East in the name of stability. Oppression became common, but stability never arrived. We must take a different approach. We must help the reformers of the Middle East as they work for freedom, and strive to build a community of peaceful, democratic nations.

This commitment to democratic reform is essential to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Peace will not be achieved by Palestinian rulers who intimidate opposition, tolerate corruption, and maintain ties to terrorist groups. The long-suffering Palestinian people deserve better. They deserve true leaders capable of creating and governing a free and peaceful Palestinian state.

Even after the setbacks and frustrations of recent months, goodwill and hard effort can achieve the promise of the road map to peace. Those who would lead a new Palestinian state should adopt peaceful means to achieve the rights of their people, and create the reformed institutions of a stable democracy. Arab states should end incitement in their own media, cut off public and private funding for terrorism, and establish normal relations with Israel. Israel should impose a settlement freeze, dismantle unauthorized outposts, end the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people, and avoid any actions that prejudice final negotiations. And world leaders should withdraw all favor and support from any Palestinian ruler who fails his people and betrays their cause.

The democratic hopes we see growing in the Middle East are growing everywhere. In the words of the Burmese democracy advocate, Aung San Suu Kyi: "We do not

accept the notion that democracy is a Western value. To the contrary; democracy simply means good government rooted in responsibility, transparency, and accountability." Here at the United Nations, you know this to be true. In recent years, this organization has helped create a new democracy in East Timor, and the U.N. has aided other nations in making the transition to self-rule.

Because I believe the advance of liberty is the path to both a safer and better world, today I propose establishing a Democracy Fund within the United Nations. This is a great calling for this great organization. The fund would help countries lay the foundations of democracy by instituting the rule of law and independent courts, a free press, political parties and trade unions. Money from the fund would also help set up voter precincts and polling places, and support the work of election monitors. To show our commitment to the new Democracy Fund, the United States will make an initial contribution. I urge other nations to contribute, as well.

Today, I've outlined a broad agenda to advance human dignity, and enhance the security of all of us. The defeat of terror, the protection of human rights, the spread of prosperity, the advance of democracy -- these causes, these ideals, call us to great work in the world. Each of us alone can only do so much. Together, we can accomplish so much more.

History will honor the high ideals of this organization. The charter states them with clarity: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights," "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

Let history also record that our generation of leaders followed through on these ideals, even in adversity. Let history show that in a decisive decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our duties, or waver in meeting them. I'm confident that this young century will be liberty's century. I believe we will rise to this moment, because I know the character of so many nations and leaders represented here today. And I have faith in the transforming power of freedom.

May God bless you.

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HC 813-1

House of Commons

Foreign Affairs Committee

The Decision to go to War in Iraq

Ninth Report of Session 2002-03: Volume 1

HC 813-1

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The Foreign Affairs Committee

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The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Office of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated public bodies.

1. We conclude that it appears likely that there was only limited access to reliable human intelligence in Iraq, and that as a consequence the United Kingdom may have been heavily reliant on US technical intelligence, on defectors and on exiles with an agenda of their own. (Paragraph 15)
2. We conclude that the March 2002 assessment of Iraq's WMD was not "suppressed", as was alleged, but that its publication was delayed as part an iterative process of updating and amendment, which culminated in the September dossier. (Paragraph 25)
3. We conclude that it is too soon to tell whether the Government's assertions on Iraq's chemical and biological weapons will be borne out. However, we have no doubt that the threat posed to United Kingdom forces was genuinely perceived as a real and present danger and that the steps taken to protect them taken were justified by the information available at the time. (Paragraph 41)
4. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes, in the light of subsequent events. (Paragraph 42)
5. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government give its current assessment of the status of the Al Samoud 2 missile infrastructure. We further recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq's ballistic missile programme generally, and the retained al-Hussein missiles in particular, in the light of subsequent events. (Paragraph 47)
6. We conclude that the accuracy of most of the claims in relation to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme can only be judged once the Survey Group has gained access to the relevant scientists and documentation. (Paragraph 53)
7. We recommend that the Foreign Secretary provide the Committee with the date on which the British intelligence community were first informed by the CIA that forged documentation in relation to Iraqi purchases of uranium from Niger existed, as soon as he has found this out. (Paragraph 57)
8. We conclude that it is very odd indeed that the Government asserts that it was not relying on the evidence which has since been shown to have been forged, but that eight months later it is still reviewing the other evidence. The assertion "... that Iraq sought the supply of significant amounts of uranium from Africa ..." should have been qualified to reflect the uncertainty. We recommend that the Government explain on what evidence it relied for its judgment in September 2002 that Iraq had recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. We further recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether it still

considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Africa, in the light of subsequent events. (Paragraph 60)

9. We conclude that the 45 minutes claim did not warrant the prominence given to it in the dossier, because it was based on intelligence from a single, uncorroborated source. We recommend that the Government explain why the claim was given such prominence. (Paragraph 70)

10. We further recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about the 45 minute claim, in the light of subsequent events. (Paragraph 71)

11. We conclude that Alastair Campbell did not play any role in the inclusion of the 45 minutes claim in the September dossier. (Paragraph 77)

12. We conclude that it was wrong for Alastair Campbell or any Special Adviser to have chaired a meeting on an intelligence matter, and we recommend that this practice cease. (Paragraph 79)

13. We conclude that on the basis of the evidence available to us Alastair Campbell did not exert or seek to exert improper influence on the drafting of the September dossier. (Paragraph 84)

14. We conclude that the claims made in the September dossier were in all probability well founded on the basis of the intelligence then available, although as we have already stated we have concerns about the emphasis given to some of them. We further conclude that, in the absence of reliable evidence that intelligence personnel have either complained about or sought to distance themselves from the content of the dossier, allegations of politically inspired meddling cannot credibly be established. (Paragraph 86)

15. We conclude that without access to the intelligence or to those who handled it, we cannot know if it was in any respect faulty or misinterpreted. Although without the Foreign Secretary's degree of knowledge, we share his confidence in the men and women who serve in the agencies. (Paragraph 90)

16. We conclude that the language used in the September dossier was in places more assertive than that traditionally used in intelligence documents. We believe that there is much value in retaining the measured and even cautious tones which have been the hallmark of intelligence assessments and we recommend that this approach be retained. (Paragraph 100)

17. We conclude that continuing disquiet and unease about the claims made in the September dossier are unlikely to be dispelled unless more evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes comes to light. (Paragraph 108)

18. We conclude that the degree of autonomy given to the Iraqi Communications Group chaired by Alastair Campbell and the Coalition Information Centre which reported to him, as well as the lack of procedural accountability, were contributory factors to the affair of the 'dodgy dossier'. (Paragraph 122)

19. The Committee also concludes that the process of compiling the February dossier

should have been more openly disclosed to Parliament. (Paragraph 123)

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20. We recommend that the Government offer every assistance to Mr Marashi in tracing his relatives in Iraq. (Paragraph 133)

21. We conclude that the effect of the February dossier was almost wholly counterproductive. By producing such a document the Government undermined the credibility of their case for war and of the other documents which were part of it. (Paragraph 138)

22. We further conclude that by referring to the document on the floor of the House as “further intelligence” the Prime Minister—who had not been informed of its provenance, doubts about which only came to light several days later—misrepresented its status and thus inadvertently made a bad situation worse. (Paragraph 139)

23. We conclude that it is wholly unacceptable for the Government to plagiarise work without attribution and to amend it without either highlighting the amendments or gaining the assent of the original author. We further conclude that it was fundamentally wrong to allow such a document to be presented to Parliament and made widely available without ministerial oversight. (Paragraph 140)

24. We recommend that any paper presented to Parliament—whether laid on the Table, made available in the Vote Office or placed in the Library—for the purpose of explaining the Government’s foreign policy be signed off by a FCO Minister. We further recommend that any FCO document presented to Parliament which draws on unofficial sources should include full transparency of sources, and attribution where appropriate. (Paragraph 141)

25. We recommend that there should be clarity over which Department has lead responsibility for groups such as the CIC. That Department should then be accountable to the relevant select committee. This would avoid the situation where nobody is prepared to take responsibility for certain interdepartmental groups. (Paragraph 149)

26. We recommend that Andrew Gilligan’s alleged contacts be thoroughly investigated. We further recommend that the Government review links between the security and intelligence agencies, the media and Parliament and the rules which apply to them. (Paragraph 154)

27. We conclude that the continuing independence and impartiality of the Joint Intelligence Committee is of utmost importance. We recommend that Ministers bear in mind at all times the importance of ensuring that the JIC is free of all political pressure. (Paragraph 159)

28. We recommend that the Intelligence and Security Committee be reconstituted as a select committee of the House of Commons. (Paragraph 167)

29. We conclude that continued refusal by Ministers to allow this committee access to intelligence papers and personnel, on this inquiry and more generally, is hampering

it in the work which Parliament has asked it to carry out. (Paragraph 170)

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30. We recommend that the Government accept the principle that it should be prepared to accede to requests from the Foreign Affairs Committee for access to intelligence, when the Committee can demonstrate that it is of key importance to a specific inquiry it is conducting and unless there are genuine concerns for national security. We further recommend that, in cases where access is refused, full reasons should be given. (Paragraph 171)

31. We conclude that the September dossier was probably as complete and accurate as the Joint Intelligence Committee could make it, consistent with protecting sources, but that it contained undue emphases for a document of its kind. We further conclude that the jury is still out on the accuracy of the September dossier until substantial evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, or of their destruction, is found. (Paragraph 186)

32. We conclude that the February dossier was badly handled and was misrepresented as to its provenance and was thus counter-productive. The furore over the process by which the document was assembled and published diverted attention from its substance. This was deeply unfortunate, because the information it contained was important. (Paragraph 187)

33. Consistent with the conclusions reached elsewhere in this Report, we conclude that Ministers did not mislead Parliament. (Paragraph 188)

7

Introduction

1. The decision to commit armed forces to war is the most momentous any leader can take. The Prime Minister took such a decision in relation to Iraq, and United Kingdom forces joined those of the other coalition partners in military action there. However, unlike previous conflicts, the war in Iraq took place only after a substantive vote in Parliament, a development which we welcome.

2. We had before us in March 2003 a number of sources of information on the situation in Iraq. Foremost among these were papers provided by the Government, in which they set out their assessment of the Iraqi regime, its human rights abuses and its weapons programmes. Much of this evidence was based on intelligence information—another welcome innovation by the present Government—and it was frequently cited by those who contributed to the debate, both inside and outside Parliament.

3. The main military phase of the conflict was over remarkably quickly, although the situation remains dangerous and the death toll continues to rise. Few would dispute that Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator and that the Iraqi people are well rid of him. But the war was fought not to effect regime change, but to enforce unanimous Resolutions of the UN Security Council. However, in addition to requiring the removal of what the British Government claimed was a “current and serious threat” from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD),¹ it should be reiterated that the reasons that Parliament granted the Government authority to

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embark on the conflict included a number of other important considerations. Most important among these was Iraq's persistent failure to comply with the ceasefire conditions it entered into at the end of the Gulf War and the fact that Iraq continued to refuse active co-operation "unconditionally and immediately" with the UN weapons inspectors. Questions have since been asked about the basis of the Government's claim. If those who cast doubt upon it are correct, and the claim was not well-founded, the war was fought on a false premise. And if the claim was exaggerated or embellished, as some have suggested, Parliament was misled.

4. This Report seeks to establish whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, within the Government as a whole, presented accurate and complete information to Parliament in the period leading up to military action in Iraq, particularly in respect of weapons of mass destruction. The focus on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is because their removal was the Government's prime objective. As the Government stated in the opening paragraph of its paper "Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives", published in March 2003, "The prime objective remains to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and their associated programmes and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles, as set out in the relevant United Nations Security Resolutions (UNSCRs)."

5. We heard oral evidence from the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw (twice); the Permanent Under Secretary FCO, Sir Michael Jay; former Foreign Secretary and Leader of the House, Robin Cook MP; former International Development Secretary Clare Short MP; the Prime Minister's special adviser and Director of Communications, Alastair Campbell; former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Dame Pauline Neville Jones; Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Dr Gary Samore; former Porton Down scientist and former Chief Executive of the Royal Society of Chemistry, Dr Thomas Inch; former UNSCOM inspector, now Director of the IISS-US, Terence Taylor; former senior intelligence analyst at the Australian Office of National Assessments, Andrew Wilkie; student and writer on Iraqi affairs, Ibrahim al-Marashi; and BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan. We received written evidence from most of these and from others. Our advisers were Wyn Bowen of Kings College, London, Richard Cobbold, Director of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and Tim Youngs of the House of Commons Library. To each of them we are most grateful.

6. We are strongly of the view that we were entitled to a greater degree of co-operation from the Government on access to witnesses and to intelligence material. Our Chairman wrote to the Prime Minister (requesting his attendance and that of Alastair Campbell); the Cabinet Office Intelligence Co-ordinator; the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee; the Chief of Defence Intelligence; the Head of the Secret Intelligence Service; and the Director of GCHQ. None of them replied. It was the Foreign Secretary who informed us that they would not appear. The Chairman wrote a further letter to Alastair Campbell and after an initial refusal he agreed to appear. We asked for direct access to Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments and to relevant FCO papers. That was refused, although some extracts were read to us in private session. We are confident that our inquiry would have been enhanced if our requests had been met. We agree with Alastair Campbell that "it would have been very odd

to have done this inquiry” without questioning him, and we regret that other witnesses, some of whom we suspect felt the same way as Mr Campbell, were prevented from appearing. Yet it is fair to state that within the Government’s self-imposed constraints the Foreign Secretary sought to be forthcoming, spending more than five hours before the Committee, and reading to us in private session limited extracts from a JIC assessment dated 9 September 2002.

7. In contrast, the Prime Minister has repeatedly said in the House that he will co-operate fully with a parallel inquiry by the statutory Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).

This is hardly surprising, since the Committee was appointed by and reports to him, and it meets entirely in private. The Foreign Affairs Committee, on the other hand, was appointed by and reports to the House of Commons, and we meet almost entirely in public. We believe that our inquiry is the more credible of the two, and that it would have been in the Government’s best interests to have given full co-operation. We have more to say in a later section in this Report on the status of the ISC and on the need for this Committee to have access to intelligence material.

8. The Government’s dossier of September 2002 sets out in detail Iraq’s history of production, use and concealment of chemical and biological weapons, and its pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme.⁶ A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, produced shortly before the Government’s dossier, was largely consistent with the Government’s assessment of Iraq’s WMD history,⁷ as was a CIA dossier produced the following month.⁸ In its use of such weapons against its own people, in its defiance of a series of mandatory United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and in its attempts to frustrate the work of UN arms inspectors in the 1990s, the Iraqi regime’s record was clear for all to see.

9. As a former Chief Inspector with UNSCOM in Iraq, Terence Taylor had first hand experience of the regime:

The Iraqi regime was repeatedly found to be acting in bad faith, doing the minimum necessary to give a semblance of co-operation and making admissions only when it was certain that UN inspectors had uncovered the truth. This was the case from 1991 through to 2003 during two generations of inspection efforts.

Mr Taylor continued:

In UNSCOM’s final report of 1999 the then Executive Chairman concluded that Iraq continued to hide substantial information about prohibited programmes and probably continued to develop them. Subsequently an independent panel of international experts headed by Ambassador Amorin endorsed this opinion. What is more UNMOVIC reviewed this evidence at the start of their work and came to the same conclusion.

10. Dr Gary Samore served in the Clinton administration and produced the IISS Report of last September. He told us that

Everyone believed during the 1990s that Iraq’s refusal to co-operate with the inspectors, both UNSCOM and the IAEA, and their persistent efforts to conceal and deny and only admit when pressed to the wall were an indication that Iraq was trying to preserve some undetermined capability and that that reflected Baghdad’s view that

the possession of or the ability to pursue nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long range ballistic missiles was essential to Iraq's strategy and defence needs. Certainly if you look at the history of the Iraqi efforts going back to the mid 1970s there does appear to be a very persistent effort on the part of the Saddam Hussein regime to develop and master those capabilities.¹²

11. The picture painted in the Government and IISS dossiers of 2002 is little different from that set out in a much shorter document released by the Government in 1998, prior to Operation Desert Fox. The 1998 'dossier' stated that

Some CW agents and munitions remain hidden. The Iraqi chemical industry could produce mustard gas almost immediately, and limited amounts of nerve gas within months ... Saddam almost certainly retains BW production equipment, stocks of agents and weapons. In any case, Iraq has the expertise and equipment to regenerate an offensive BW capability within weeks. If Iraq's nuclear programme had not been halted by the Gulf conflict, Saddam might have had a nuclear weapon by 1993. If Iraq could procure the necessary machinery and materials abroad, it could build a crude air-delivered nuclear device in about five years. Iraq could design a viable nuclear weapon now.

12. Much of what is known about Iraq since the withdrawal of UNSCOM in 1998 and the subsequent bombing campaign, known as Operation Desert Fox, has necessarily come from intelligence activity. In his foreword to the September 2002 dossier, the Prime Minister acknowledged the challenge Iraq posed in terms of acquiring hard intelligence: "Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam's is one of the most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world."¹⁴ Dr Gary Samore said that "The record of Western intelligence agencies collecting information on Iraq's various weapons programmes is very poor."

13. As a former Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook knew well the difficulties faced by the intelligence agencies:

... often when you are told a piece of information you are left with very real doubts over why you are being told that information. Are you being told it to mislead you? Are you being told it by somebody who actually wants to be paid but may not actually turn out to be reliable; or is not somebody—as I think was the case with some of the Iraqi exiles pursuing their own political agenda—who wants you to hear what suits them? All these questions and motivation form very great difficulty over making your assessment of intelligence. I hope I have made it clear throughout all of this I do not criticise the intelligence services whom I think have tried very hard to do their best in extremely difficult circumstances. In fairness to the intelligence community one should recognise that Iraq was an appallingly difficult intelligence target to break. We had very little access to human intelligence on the ground and no hope whatsoever of putting in Western agents.

14. Mr Cook also suggested that the United Kingdom may have been over-reliant on intelligence supplied under the sharing arrangements with its allies:

I would be astonished if it [the reliance of the September dossier on intelligence supplied by the US] was not immense. The United States and the United Kingdom have a unique intelligence relationship which has probably never existed in any period of history, in which on our side we have full transparency and we strive to secure full transparency on their side. Therefore, it is often difficult when you look at intelligence assessments to spot which raw data was originally gathered by the United Kingdom and which was originally gathered by the United States. As a rough rule of thumb, and it is very rough, we tend to be rather better at gathering human intelligence; and, although we have an excellent GCHQ station, the Americans are even more formidable in technological ways of gathering intelligence. That said, neither of us really had much human intelligence inside Iraq. The Americans were drawing heavily on exiles who were inside America.¹⁷

15. We conclude that it appears likely that there was only limited access to reliable human intelligence in Iraq, and that as a consequence the United Kingdom may have been heavily reliant on US technical intelligence, on defectors and on exiles with an agenda of their own.

16. The United Kingdom's intelligence machinery is well established. Raw intelligence from human and technical sources is gathered by the security and intelligence agencies. The agencies assess the quality and reliability of the intelligence,¹⁸ before passing information to the assessments staff located in the Cabinet Office, who pull it together for consideration by the Joint Intelligence Committee.¹⁹ The JIC, on which the various providers and consumers of intelligence are represented, then draws on the intelligence to produce its assessments, which are intended to be an aid to policy making by Ministers.

17. The JIC meets weekly. According to one of its former Chairmen, Dame Pauline Neville Jones, the JIC's priorities and work programme are determined by the strategic priorities of the Government and of its allies.²² Dame Pauline depicted "a structure which works within a framework of agreed priorities and an agreed work programme."

18. Intelligence and JIC assessments are just two of the sources available to FCO officials and Ministers when making foreign policy decisions. There are many open sources of information, from published journals to academic studies, of which considerable use is made. Diplomatic reporting from United Kingdom Posts abroad is also used, although since 1990 this important source was not available in respect of Iraq.²⁵

19. In the following sections of this Report, we consider whether the system just described worked as intended in the period leading up to military action in Iraq. We focus on the two documents about which serious allegations have been made: *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government*, dated September 2002, published on 24 September 2002, prior to the major debate that day in Parliament, which had been recalled to debate the Iraq crisis; and *Iraq—its infrastructure of concealment, deception and intimidation*, the infamous 'dodgy dossier', dated January 2003, released on the Prime Minister's return from a visit to the United States on 3 February 2003.

The September Dossier

The September dossier was not the first of its kind. In Reports published during the last two years, we have praised the Government for placing in the public domain information derived from intelligence and other sources, which assisted Parliament, the press and public in understanding the complex issues which have to be dealt with as part of the war against terrorism. Last July, we recommended that the Government follow the precedent which it set in the period leading up to military action in Afghanistan, and publish the fullest possible documentation on the need for any further military action, before such action is seriously contemplated.

While nothing should be published which might compromise sources or methods of intelligence, the Government must try to secure the widest possible support in Parliament and among the British people if it is proposing to risk the lives of British servicemen and women as part of a further phase of the war against terrorism.²⁶ 21. We see the September dossier as part of the Government's response to that recommendation, and for that reason we welcomed it in a further Report, published in December 2002. In that Report and elsewhere, we have recognised there is a balance to be struck between maintaining the integrity of sources and the need to inform public and parliamentary opinion. Dame Pauline Neville Jones recognised the difficulty of maintaining this balance:

It is not easy to ask people to send their sons and husbands into military conflict on the basis of evidence which the Government says, "it is too secret for me to be able tell you what I know". I think that is a very difficult proposition in a democracy. It did seem to me at the time that a way did have to be found for material of which the Government disposed, which had clearly convinced it there was a real threat, could be made available so that the rest of us could understand what that was and why we were being told this was so serious. The issue at the time certainly seemed to me how you did that in a manner compatible with the protection of the sources That is so far as I know an unprecedented thing to try and do. In early 2002, reports in the press suggested the Government was about to release a dossier setting out its case on Iraq. Before this Committee on 23 April, the then FCO Minister Ben Bradshaw said "We will put more evidence in the public domain and we will publish in whatever form we think is the most effective. ... When we feel the time is right." On 2 May, the FCO told us that "A joint paper, in consultation with No. 10, is being considered, but no firm date has yet been set for publication." We now know that these reports related to a JIC assessment of Iraq's WMD capability. Peter Ricketts, Director General Political at the FCO, told us that "In March a draft was produced drawing on JIC material with other material as well, much less detailed than the eventual September dossier but it was decided not to publish at that time and to build up a fuller picture, which eventually emerged in the September dossier." That draft, we were told by a FCO member of the JIC, William Ehrman, was put together by the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff.

However, at the time, Jack Straw suggested that “publication of a dossier ... is held up only by difficulties in determining whether intelligence should be made public.” Mr Ricketts’ comments lend credence to the view that the March paper did not provide as full a picture as the Government would have wished, that it was a bit thin. Recently, however, there have been allegations that the March paper was “suppressed”. It has been suggested that the Government decided not to publish, because the paper did not support its case against Iraq. As a former Chairman of the JIC, Dame Pauline Neville Jones had not experienced anything of this kind: “I can certainly confirm to the best of my recollection so far as I know no piece of paper, no assessment that we put up [to Ministers] was subsequently put in a locker and not circulated.”

We asked the FCO to respond to the charge. They told us No JIC assessments were suppressed. The Assessments Staff, in coordination with the intelligence agencies, DIS and policy departments, including the FCO, prepared a paper in March on WMD in Iraq intended for possible publication.

We also note that on 1 May, the Government published information which it can safely be assumed came from the March assessment.

We conclude that the March 2002 assessment of Iraq’s WMD was not “suppressed”, as was alleged, but that its publication was delayed as part an iterative process of updating and amendment, which culminated in the September dossier.

We were told that the early drafts of the WMD paper which became the September dossier were produced in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. On 3 September, a decision was taken to publish the paper, broadly in the form it eventually took, and responsibility passed to the Chairman of the JIC,⁴⁰ who then “pulled together work from a number of different JIC assessments.”⁴¹ There followed a process of consultation with departmental officials, Ministers and special advisers.⁴² A meeting was held on 9 September; a draft was produced on 10 September; a further draft appeared on 17 September; and a final draft followed on 19 September, followed by publication five days later. Handing responsibility for the dossier to the Chairman of the JIC was a prudent and necessary step for production of a document which relied to a great extent on intelligence material, but it does confer a degree of ambiguity on the term “first draft” as it applies to the dossier. Because the Government has refused to allow us sight of the drafts, we have been unable to make a firm judgment as to whether the paper produced in March, the subsequent papers produced as part of what the Foreign Secretary told us was an “iterative process”, and the JIC-produced drafts vary materially. We entirely accept, as we state in relation to a specific case below, that as material came in it was legitimate to assess and, where appropriate, to insert it. We also appreciate the Foreign Secretary’s candour in reading to us in private session limited extracts from the JIC assessment of 9 September. It would have been in the Government’s interest to have given us sufficient information to allow us to state with complete confidence that nothing of substance was added between March and September, other than new information as it came to light, but they did not do so.

The process for compiling and approving the dossier involved a number of people as

well as the JIC and the intelligence agencies, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Office Ministers, Special Advisers and officials. But apart from the foreword, the document— including the executive summary—was written by the Chairman of the JIC, and it was he who signed it off. Although there has been much press speculation on this point, no substantiated evidence has been put before us that Mr Scarlett or any other senior intelligence official dissented from the contents of the dossier; indeed, the bulk of the evidence is to the contrary.

A claim which was not in the September dossier, but which has gained such currency is included here. Contrary to what is sometimes suggested, it is a matter of fact that the dossier never claimed that the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was "imminent" or "immediate". The Foreign

Secretary told us that neither the Prime Minister nor I or anybody acting on our behalf has ever used the words "immediate or imminent" threat, never used those words, in relation to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. What we talked about in the dossier was a current and serious threat, which is very different. ... We did say there was a current and serious threat, and I stand by that judgment completely.⁴⁹

And in the House on 24 September the Prime Minister answered the question "Why now?" by saying "I agree that I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will use his weapons."

It is a matter of judgment whether a "current and serious threat" is "very different" in public perception from an "imminent" or "immediate" one, particularly when coupled with the Government's statement in its September 2002 dossier that "Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so." It is also notable that the danger of delaying military intervention in Iraq, including to Britain's own security, was a central theme of the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons of 18 March 2003—on the eve of war. We now consider the accuracy of a number of claims which were made in the dossier.

The September dossier made some strong claims about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability:

As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:

continued to produce chemical and biological agents;

military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them.

command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons ... ;

developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;

pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes.

There was, however, no indication of the scale and scope of Iraq's present arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, although the dossier did set out the quantities of

precursors and biological and chemical agents which remained unaccounted for when UNSCOM inspections ceased in 1998.

These claims were supported by Terence Taylor, former UNSCOM inspector, who said: "From all the information available, I think it would be very surprising if they did not have operational biological and chemical weapons, very surprising indeed. They certainly had all the capability to do that. They never satisfactorily accounted for all the munitions, filled and unfilled, and they never satisfactorily accounted for all the material by a long way. We are not talking about marginal differences, we are talking about hundreds of kilograms, we are talking about hundreds of munitions, that is things like 155 mm artillery rounds and 122 mm rockets, air delivered bombs."

Gary Samore was less confident than he had been at the time he produced the IISS dossier in September 2002.

If they had actually deployed such weapons it is likely that coalition forces would have stumbled across them just as they have stumbled across abandoned tanks and artillery pieces and so forth, so it does not appear to me likely that Iraq actually deployed chemical or biological weapons. Of course, it is still possible that there are hidden caches of such weapons and the Iraqi forces collapsed so quickly that they never really had a chance to move them into the field.

Dr Tom Inch thought that chemical residues would remain at key sites:

If a site had been declared as a chemical weapons producing site, or if the original inspectors at the end of the Gulf War knew it was a site, you would not find out the information, but if there was intelligence pointing to quite new production facilities that were being denied as production facilities by the Iraqis, then I believe that the trace analysis and so on of certain residues would probably give confirmation of whether or not that was a correct statement.

We put this point to the FCO, who responded that "In general, we agree that post-event chemical analysis of sites may be able to confirm assessments, although it should be recognised that Iraq carried out a large campaign of site sanitation."

Andrew Gilligan quoted his anonymous source as saying that

"I believe it is 30 per cent likely that there was a CW (Chemical Weapons) programme in the six months before the war and, more likely, that there was a (Biological weapons) programme, but it was small because you could not have a larger programme. The sanctions were actually quite effective, they did limit the programme."

Robin Cook, too, felt that the policy of containment had been successful.

A no less sceptical approach was taken by Dr Tom Inch, who picked up on the statement in the dossier that "In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months.":

... I would have thought that to be able to make that kind of statement in terms of

weeks for mustard gas and months for nerve agents, that there must have been some pretty good intelligence that suggested where and how those two time scales were going to differ. That would be a question that I would want to ask: how good was that?

The FCO said in response that the assessment was based, not on intelligence, but on a “judgment”. This illustrates the range of sources for the conclusions reached in the dossier, some of which do not rely on specific intelligence information.

The fact that chemical precursors and other substances have not been accounted for does not mean that they exist. Mr Hans Blix, the Chairman of UNMOVIC, on more than one occasion specifically warned the UN Security Council about the danger of jumping to the conclusion that because proscribed items were unaccounted for, they exist. Presenting his 13th quarterly report to the Security Council on 5 June 2003 he said: “The first point, made in paragraph 8 of the report, is that the Commission has not at any time during the inspections in Iraq found evidence of the continuation or resumption of programmes of weapons of mass destruction or significant quantities of proscribed items – whether from pre-1991 or later. There is, however, no necessity that such items do not exist.

They might—there remain long lists of items unaccounted for—but it is not justified to jump to the conclusion that something exists just because it is unaccounted for.” Moreover, chemical precursors and other chemical and biological weapons substances degrade at varying rates over time, but some of them degrade quite swiftly, as the IISS pointed out in its dossier.⁶³ None of this detracts, of course, from the central fact that Saddam Hussein did not comply with the requirements of numerous, binding resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Coalition forces carried CBW protection equipment when in theatre. The suits are cumbersome and detract from the operational efficiency of the wearer. We do not believe that military chiefs would have tolerated this without having good reason to do so. We are confident that the only reason chiefs would have asked their troops to fight so encumbered would have been because they took very seriously indeed the threat of CBW attack. As Dame Pauline Neville Jones put it: “I do not think you send your soldiers out to exercise in chemical suits if you are trying to pull a fast one.”⁶⁴ Some Iraqi forces also apparently had access to such gear, presumably for good reason.

We conclude that it is too soon to tell whether the Government’s assertions on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons will be borne out. However, we have no doubt that the threat posed to United Kingdom forces was genuinely perceived as a real and present danger and that the steps taken to protect them taken were justified by the information available at the time. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes, in the light of subsequent events

The dossier makes the following claim about Iraq’s long-range missile capability:

According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles were either hidden from the UN

as complete systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some require reassembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be available for use. They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.

THE ABOVE IS ONLY A SELECTED PART OF THE ENTIRE REPORT ON THE DODGY DOSSIER. THE ENTIRE REPORT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE ON REQUEST.

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